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GOVERNMENT CHOICES IN INNOVATION FUNDING (WITH 
REFERENCE TO CLIMATE CHANGE) 
Joshua D. Sarnoff∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Huge amounts of money will soon be spent by governments and private 
entities to develop technology to reduce the costs of climate change mitigation 
and adaptation, and to deploy new energy and transportation infrastructures. 
Incredibly, we still lack any good idea of the best means of providing massive 
amounts of government or private money so as to promote the most innovation 
and technology diffusion at the lowest cost. This Article seeks to support better 
analyses of, and decision making regarding, the choices of government 
innovation-funding mechanisms by discussing the limits of current analyses 
and providing a taxonomy of such measures. It also proposes future work to 
better analyze what we know about these choices and their relative 
effectiveness, and it discusses new measures to expand our knowledge base, 
which include: (1) better tracking of government innovation-funding inputs 
and outputs; (2) better documentation of and self-conscious decision making 
regarding funding choices; and (3) creating experiments that go beyond 
existing natural experiments. 
INTRODUCTION 
Huge amounts of money will soon be spent by governments (including 
government agencies, laboratories, corporations, and other public actors) and 
private entities (including corporations, foundations, nonprofit entities, 
universities, and others) to develop technology to reduce the costs of climate 
change mitigation and adaptation, and to deploy new energy and transportation 
infrastructures. As a matter of international law, developed country members 
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of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)1 
committed in the 2010 Cancun Agreement2 to transfer public and private funds 
and technology for mitigation measures to developing countries. The agreed 
funding was at least $30 billion per year, rising to at least $100 billion per year 
by 2020. In the 2011 Durban Platform,3 the UNFCCC reaffirmed that 
commitment and created the framework institutional structure for 
implementing it. Recent analyses suggest that number is low by an order of 
magnitude, as developing countries may need at least $1 trillion per year to 
meet mitigation and adaptation needs.4 As a matter of market economics, tens 
(and perhaps hundreds) of trillions of dollars will soon flow to develop and 
disseminate a wide range of new technologies to upgrade energy, 
transportation, and other infrastructure; to develop low greenhouse gas-
emitting consumer and industrial products; and to mitigate and adapt to the 
effects of climate change (collectively referred to as climate change 
technologies).5 These funds will come either from governments or, by default, 
 
 1 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, S. TREATY DOC. No. 102-38, 1771 
U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
 2 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the Parties, 16th Sess., 
Cancun, Mex., Nov. 29 to Dec. 10, 2010, Report of the Conference of the Parties, ¶¶ 98–99, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2011) [hereinafter UNFCCC Cancun Agreement], available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page=2. 
 3 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the Parties, 17th Sess., 
Durban, S. Afr., Nov. 28 to Dec. 9, 2011, Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform 
for Enhanced Action, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/L.10 (Dec. 10, 2011) [hereinafter UNFCCC Durban 
Platform], available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/l10.pdf; see also United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the Parties, 17th Sess., Durban, S. Afr., Nov. 28 to 
Dec. 11, 2011, Report of the Conference of the Parties, ¶¶ 126–43, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9 (Mar. 15, 
2012) [hereinafter UNFCCC Durban WG-LCA Decisions], available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/ 
2011/cop17/eng/09.pdf.  
 4 See Meena Raman, Trillions of Dollars Needed for Climate Finance, SOUTH CENTRE (Aug. 17, 2012), 
http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1818%3Atrillions-of-dollars-
needed-for-climate-finance-17-august-2012&catid=149%3Asouthnews&Itemid=355&lang=en (discussing 
converging estimates based on published studies by the World Bank, the United Nations, and the International 
Energy Administration); see also WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010: DEVELOPMENT AND 
CLIMATE CHANGE 257–85 (2010) (estimating cost-effective mitigation measures between $4 and $25 trillion 
over the next century for a 420–425 ppm CO2e stabilization scenario, and discussing the funding needed for 
both mitigation and adaptation technology development and deployment). 
 5 See, e.g., BERNICE LEE ET AL., WHO OWNS OUR LOW CARBON FUTURE?: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES 3 (2009) (discussing International Energy Agency (IEA) and Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) studies); WORLD BANK, supra note 4, at 261 (discussing anticipated 
transportation and other investments); Lawrence H. Goulder & William A. Pizer, The Economics of Climate 
Change 13 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 06-06, 2006) (discussing anticipated investments in 
energy infrastructure); Raman, supra note 4 (referencing an IEA 2012 study of energy technology that 
predicted $370 billion annual investments by 2020 in power generation infrastructure in a two-degree Celsius 
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from private sources subject to government incentives and regulation of market 
behaviors. 
Incredibly, after centuries of experience, we still lack any clear theory or 
good comparative empirical analyses from which to determine the best form of 
deploying such massive amounts of government money, inducing private 
money, or creating public–private partnerships (PPPs) to promote the most 
innovation, technology development, and diffusion at the lowest cost.6 The 
most relevant theoretical analyses stress the general advantages of public 
financing and public-domain treatment of innovations over private financing 
and intellectual property rights, based on the economic theories that such rights 
lead to reduced consumer welfare (deadweight losses) in the absence of perfect 
price discrimination, and that single-market taxation is less efficient than 
broad-based taxation.7 They also identify a number of superior features of 
government funding, including: the ability to shift resources to the most 
promising investments when the initial approach to innovation is uncertain, 
and better coordination of funding levels or parties to avoid inefficiently low 
entry levels or duplication of efforts.8 They recognize, however, that 
intellectual property rights sometimes have superior features to alternatives 
such as prizes and subsidies.9 Overlapping (“hybrid”) approaches may 
 
temperature-rise scenario, increasing to $630 billion between 2020 and 2030 and $760 billion between 2030 
and 2050). 
 6 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE 
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 624 (1962) (“There is 
clear need for further study of alternative methods of compensation [for inventions].”); cf., e.g., Ger Klaassen 
et al., The Impact of R&D on Innovation for Wind Energy in Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom, 54 
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 227 (2005) (discussing how governments should address infrastructure challenges and 
manage associated fiscal and macroeconomic risks); Gerd Schwartz et al., Introduction to PUBLIC INVESTMENT 
AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: ADDRESSING INFRASTRUCTURE CHALLENGES AND MANAGING FISCAL 
RISKS 1, 1 (Gerd Schwartz et al. eds., 2008) (same). See generally GER KLAASSEN ET AL., INT’L INST. FOR 
APPLIED SYS. ANALYSIS, IR-03-011, PUBLIC R&D AND INNOVATION: THE CASE OF WIND ENERGY IN 
DENMARK, GERMANY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM (2003) (providing a comparative analysis of one technology 
across three countries), available at http://webarchive.iiasa.ac.at/Admin/PUB/Documents/IR-03-011.pdf; 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND PUBLIC POLICY (Yong S. Lee ed., 1997) (discussing different collaborative 
interactions among research universities, federal laboratories, and industries in the United States).  
 7 See, e.g., Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive 
System?, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51, 54 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2002); Stephen M. 
Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, Procuring Knowledge, in 15 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
ENTREPRENUERSHIP: ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
1, 2, 27 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2004). 
 8 See, e.g., Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 7, at 21–23 (also noting the assumption that ideas for 
development and approaches to problem solving are common knowledge). 
 9 See, e.g., Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 7, at 54–55 (noting potentially superior knowledge of costs 
and benefits of R&D for screening investments; the potential to elicit higher levels of effort—like a lottery 
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sometimes be needed to correct perverse incentives of providing either public 
or private financing. Public or private financing choices may depend on 
whether and when the social value and costs of developing ideas are known, 
observable, and able to be aggregated.10 This is particularly true where private 
firms possess information on value or costs that needs to be aggregated for 
efficient decision making, and when only the government can compel such 
information to be disclosed.11 Accordingly, these analyses highlight the 
importance of comparative analysis of public and private institutions and of 
their innovation-relevant features.12 
There are many types of innovation, moreover, including: product and 
process, institutional, complementary, and marketing. It is commonplace to 
distinguish innovation—understood as reduction of ideas to practice—from 
invention—understood as the conception of ideas (although not limited to 
functional ideas that are the subject of patent rights).13 However, the 
boundaries of these categories are not conceptually distinct, and the categories 
may hide rather than reveal important intersections of different kinds of 
activities.14 Innovation is also often equated with commercialization—or 
applied research (as distinguished from basic research)—although achieving 
practical applications does not always involve commercial activity for the 
applications to become widespread.15 
Further, scientific and technological developments do not usually follow a 
linear path. Given this heterogeneity, it is intuitively unlikely that there are 
 
compared to a certain, fixed lower sum; and the ability to avoid taxpayer revolts for certain kinds of 
investments). 
 10 Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 7, at 1, 4–6, 21–23; Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 7, at 54–55, 57–
61, 65–69. 
 11 See, e.g., Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 7, at 57, 58 & n.3. 
 12 See generally Daron Acemoglu et al., The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change and 
Economic Growth (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9378, 2002); Edward L. Glaeser et al., 
An Economic Approach to Social Capital, 112 ECON. J. F437 (2002); Douglass C. North, Institutions, J. ECON. 
PERSP., Winter 1991, at 97.  
 13 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, The Macro-Context of the Microeconomics of Innovation, in 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, AND THE GROWTH MECHANISM OF THE FREE-ENTERPRISE ECONOMIES 20, 
22 (Eytan Sheshinski et al. eds., 2007) (citing JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT (1983); 1 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, BUSINESS CYCLES: A THEORETICAL, HISTORICAL, AND 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CAPITALIST PROCESS (1939)). 
 14 See, e.g., Brett Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of U.S. Science and 
Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347, 348–49 (2000). 
 15 See, e.g., id. at 349–51; Thomas Brzustowski, Government Assistance to and Policy Toward 
Innovation, Remarks at the Proceedings of the Canada–United States Law Institute Conference on 
Comparative Aspects of Innovation in Canada and the United States (Apr. 7–8, 2006), in 32 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 39, 
39, 41 (2006) [hereinafter Can.–U.S. Proceedings 2006]. 
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simple or necessary answers to what works best, when, and why. Recent (and 
long-standing) comparative institutional and country analyses suggest that 
effective government choices concerning the form of innovation funding are 
contingent and contextual, rather than necessary and invariant.16 Theoretical 
analyses suggest that the most efficient incentive mechanism may be context-
specific, path-dependent (considering, inter alia, historic patterns of trade), and 
reliant on the efficiency of licensing markets.17 The fundamental assumptions 
driving decision making also may require additional justification, but analyses 
to identify when the assumptions hold may be lacking.18 Further, theoretical or 
institutional analyses may not evaluate all relevant potential alternatives,19 or 
analyze the comparative abilities and potential abilities of private- and public-
sector decision makers. 
 
 16 See, e.g., DAN BREZNITZ, INNOVATION AND THE STATE: POLITICAL CHOICE AND STRATEGIES FOR 
GROWTH IN ISRAEL, TAIWAN, AND IRELAND 17 (2007) (“There are many ways by which state and industry can 
interlink, and each one of them necessitates a different division of labor and gives rise to different industrial 
capabilities. . . . [W]e no longer can view the state as a unitary actor.”); VANNEVAR BUSH, SCIENCE: THE 
ENDLESS FRONTIER 14–17 (1945) (discussing relative abilities and limitations of university-based, 
government-agency-based, and industry-based research); id. at 26–27 (discussing “five fundamentals” of 
government support for scientific R&D promoted by a national science foundation: (1) funding stability; (2) 
employee knowledge, capabilities, and interests; (3) support for external not intramural research; (4) internal 
control over the research by university fundees; and (5) budgetary controls and political accountability); MARK 
DODGSON & JOHN BESSANT, EFFECTIVE INNOVATION POLICY: A NEW APPROACH 3–4 (1996) (noting the 
diversity in government policies and needs of firms, particularly with regard to resources, competencies, and 
innovative capabilities). 
 17 Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 7, at 1–2; Philippe Aghion et al., Carbon Taxes, Path Dependency 
and Directed Technical Change: Evidence from the Auto Industry 2–5 (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, 
Working Paper No. 99.2012, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2202047. 
 18 For example, economists tend to assume that innovation will be maximized and investment will reach 
efficient levels if private returns on investment are equated with the social value of the innovations. 
Economists also note that intellectual property may be inefficient where social value is not appropriable or the 
rewards are too low to cover R&D costs, whereas prize rewards should be set below social value where the 
costs are expected to be lower than the social value. See, e.g., Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 7, at 60–62; 
Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 7, at 2, 10. See generally Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of 
Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 29, 31. However, these 
analyses may fail to adequately account for positive externalities (social-welfare-enhancing spillovers) that are 
generated when lower private returns are sufficient to induce investments in making innovations. See, e.g., 
Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1032, 1044 (2005). 
When this will occur, however, is not always clear. These conflicting analyses also may reflect differing views 
about whether innovation is a continuous or discontinuous function of investments. 
 19 For example, the economics literature focuses on intellectual property, government procurement, 
government grants, and other subsidies, and somewhat less frequently on “intramural” government research 
(i.e., direct development), but it typically does not address government creation of commons. Maurer & 
Scotchmer, supra note 7, at 17; see infra Part II (classifying measures). 
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This Article seeks to provide a better understanding of these choices.20 Part 
I summarizes some basic insights regarding government innovation funding 
choices that do not take us very far, some analytic approaches that have been 
developing, and suggestions for their expansion that might get us much 
farther.21 Part II provides a taxonomy of the government innovation funding 
choices that demonstrates similarities and differences among the choices and 
identifies some interrelationships among them. The taxonomy may provide 
some immediate assistance to decision makers and analysts by highlighting the 
possibilities, and by denaturalizing the existing choices to counteract the 
gravitational pull toward path dependence. 
I. BASIC INSIGHTS AND NEW APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING 
GOVERNMENT INNOVATION CHOICES 
Research and development (R&D), particularly basic R&D, are public 
goods with substantial positive spillovers. They require government funding or 
other inducements to reach social-welfare-maximizing levels because 
commercial markets will otherwise underproduce them.22 Similarly, 
infrastructure is a public good that private commercial markets are expected to 
underproduce. Infrastructure thus requires public investment, whether through 
(1) direct government provision; (2) government subsidization of fixed costs; 
(3) some form of nonprofit-sector supply (which may imply government tax 
subsidies); or (4) commercial provision by charging above marginal costs 
(which may imply antitrust or sectoral market regulation, intellectual property 
rights, or other government action).23 
 
 20 Cf. Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2008) (proposing a new executive entity that would focus on cross-agency innovation 
policies).  
 21 I hope in future articles to expand on the insights provided here and to provide more refined 
suggestions for better tracking of inputs to and outputs of innovation funding, for mandatory documentation of 
decision making, and for creation of innovation experiments across jurisdictions.  
 22 See, e.g., EDWIN S. MILLS, THE BURDEN OF GOVERNMENT 40 (1986); see also DOMINIQUE FORAY, 
ECONOMICS OF KNOWLEDGE 8, 16 (2004) (citing Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economic Implications of Learning 
by Doing, 29 REV. ECON. STUD. 155 (1962); Nathan Rosenberg, Learning by Using, in INSIDE THE BLACK 
BOX: TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMICS 120 (Nathan Rosenberg ed., 1982)) (noting the public-good character of 
knowledge and differences between private and social returns, as well as the claim that knowledge production 
may occur even if it is not the immediate goal, in light of learning by doing and learning by using). 
 23 See, e.g., FRITZ MACHLUP, SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, & COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85th CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 16–17 (Comm. Print 
1958) (discussing “expenses beyond the means of private concerns” and noting four government alternatives 
to promote additional R&D beyond what the private sector would provide: research grants or subsidies; prizes 
or bonuses; monopoly grants through patents; and government research agencies); BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, 
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Government decision making may dramatically affect R&D markets.24 For 
example, government decision makers use a mix of mechanisms to promote 
innovation,25 and they tend to rely more heavily on particular forms of funding 
choices for technology development and economic growth in different 
industrial sectors. Government procurement has predominated for R&D in 
national defense (given the government’s historic monopoly on military 
activity), whereas subsidies to universities (and to some private firms) for basic 
R&D—combined with intellectual property rights and private funding for 
applied R&D—have predominated for pharmaceuticals and biotechnology.26 
Further, it is often and inappropriately assumed27 that we need to rely on 
private industry expertise and intellectual property rights to perform applied 
research and to commercialize innovations that derive from basic research, at 
least for research that is already subsidized by the government.28 
Beyond these basic and important (but sometimes wrong) insights, we 
know far too little to intelligently guide our choices of the form of government 
funding to best promote innovation. As noted over a decade ago, “Despite 
wide recognition that socially efficient production of innovation (of all types) 
requires a comprehensive, complicated ‘mix’ of federal institutions, 
comparative institutional analysis is lacking, particularly in terms of mixed 
systems that rely on multiple institutions.”29 Further, a wide range of 
 
INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES 5–6, 12–15 (2012) (describing infrastructure as 
an “impure public good” because of capacity limits).  
 24 See, e.g., BREZNITZ, supra note 16, at 26–28 (discussing “systems-of-innovation” theories that seek to 
explain R&D by reference to location within the industrial system, financing, and industrial opportunities, all 
of which are affected by state decisions). 
 25 See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 14, at 350. 
 26 See, e.g., FORAY, supra note 22, at 225–27 (citing Iain M. Cockburn, The Changing Structure of the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, HEALTH AFF., Jan./Feb. 2004, at 10); VERNON W. RUTTAN, IS WAR NECESSARY FOR 
ECONOMIC GROWTH?: MILITARY PROCUREMENT AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT 108–09 (2006) 
(contrasting defense-related research funding for computers and semiconductors with defense-related research 
funding for software, and noting declines in defense-related funding of academic institutions and shifts of such 
funding toward applied R&D in the 1980s); see also Frischmann, supra note 14, at 380 (noting that subsidies 
or procurement are needed for areas such as national defense because intellectual property exclusive rights are 
ineffective in markets for products with non-rivalrous consumption); Rebecca Henderson & Iain Cockburn, 
Scale, Scope, and Spillovers: The Determinants of Research Productivity in Drug Discovery, 27 RAND J. 
ECON. 32, 56 (1996) (finding substantial inter-firm spillovers of R&D knowledge in the pharmaceutical 
industry). 
 27 See Frischmann, supra note 14, at 347 n.2 (citing Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private 
Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663 
(1996)) (discussing problems with justifications for the approach chosen, and noting that economic theory 
suggests adoption of non-uniform approaches); infra notes 64–76 and accompanying text. 
 28 See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 14, at 395–413. 
 29 Id. at 350. 
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government decision making that is not directly targeted at innovation can 
affect the markets for which innovation is desired.30 Globalization of 
production31 and cultural and historical differences among nations32 only 
multiply the questions that are unanswered. 
A. Limits to Existing Input–Output Analyses, and Institution-Based and 
Creativity-Based Approaches 
Some past analytic efforts to get at these issues have examined the 
proportion of government R&D spending on activities undertaken directly by 
the government compared to those undertaken by the private and nonprofit 
sectors. These studies noted the difficulty of determining how much R&D—
even for basic science—should be undertaken or sponsored by the public 
sector.33 The outputs of such innovation funding, moreover, typically are not 
tracked, much less analyzed to determine how the outputs relate to the various 
types of spending inputs.34 Even if the outputs were tracked and analyzed, 
there would be substantial difficulties in determining which inputs and outputs 
to measure and how far downstream to look.35 Further, in comparing the inputs 
and outputs across different technological fields, the market structures may be 
affected by the innovations themselves.36 
 
 30 See, e.g., BREZNITZ, supra note 16, at 26–28; Frischmann, supra note 14, at 351–52 (discussing “costly 
distortions” of markets by “poorly targeted” government interventions). 
 31 See, e.g., BREZNITZ, supra note 16, at 20–25 (noting the growth of worldwide production networks and 
increasing fragmentation of the production process and research into “global production networks”). 
 32 See, e.g., id. at 6 (noting the existence of multiple, but very different, successful national models of 
technology development in the information technology sector, and identifying three factors that affect state–
industry relations and international and financial interactions: (1) state acquisition of knowledge and skills; (2) 
states addressing research market failures by lowering private entry risks; and (3) states acting to link local 
industry with multinational corporations and financial markets). 
 33 See, e.g., KEITH NORRIS & JOHN VAIZEY, THE ECONOMICS OF RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY 104–20 
(1973). 
 34 See, e.g., Alan Nymark, Canadian Governmental Support for Innovation, Remarks at the Proceedings 
of the Canada–United States Law Institute Conference on Promoting and Protecting Innovation in a Changing 
World (Apr. 21–23, 1995), in 21 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 37, 42 (1995); cf. LAURA ANADON ET AL., BELFER CTR. FOR 
SCI. & INT’L AFFAIRS, U.S. PUBLIC ENERGY INNOVATION INSTITUTIONS AND MECHANISMS: STATUS AND 
DEFICIENCIES 1 (2010) (stating that “all initiatives and institutions [should be] required to consistently collect 
metrics on relevant outputs and outcomes and information about projects”). 
 35 See, e.g., Zoltan J. Acs & David B. Audretsch, Innovation and Technological Change: An Overview, 
in INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 1, 3–6 (Zoltan J. Acs & 
David B. Audretsch eds., 1991) (noting typical measures of research expenditure inputs, intermediate 
outputs—such as the number of inventions and patent counts, and direct measures of output—such as 
databases of innovations, and discussing problems with these measures). 
 36 See, e.g., F. M. SCHERER, INNOVATION AND GROWTH: SCHUMPETERIAN PERSPECTIVES 1 (1984); Acs & 
Audretsch, supra note 35, at 3, 15–16 (citing Simon Kuznets, Inventive Activity: Problems of Definition and 
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Notwithstanding these difficulties, there are very good reasons to try to 
understand these issues better so as to improve innovation policy. This is 
particularly true regarding climate change mitigation and adaptation 
technologies, and infrastructure investments—given the importance of the 
needs and magnitude of the social and fiscal costs to be borne by the world, or 
more parochially by particular countries. Among these reasons are: improving 
competitive trade position; reducing adverse impacts of climate change more 
effectively and quickly; reducing burdens to the economy of effectuating 
climate policy; and reducing foreign aid and treaty compliance costs. 
In contrast to the paucity of our macrounderstanding of these innovation 
funding choices,37 substantial microanalyses have been developing regarding 
invention and innovation and their promotion. These analyses address, inter 
alia: the economics of intellectual property;38 the variety of innovation 
paradigms beyond mass-market sellers of products (and particularly the 
development of user-innovation and user-generated content);39 and the 
determinants of invention- and innovation-creation behaviors. These 
determinants include, but are not limited to: whether innovation inputs and 
outputs are recognized as property rights or use other control mechanisms, 
such as access and employee mobility restraints; and whether the inputs and 
 
Measurement, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY, supra note 6, at 19); Wesley M. Cohen 
& Richard C. Levin, Empirical Studies of Innovation and Market Structure, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 1059 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989); Partha Dasgupta, The Theory of 
Technological Competition, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANALYSIS OF MARKET STRUCTURE 519 (Joseph E. 
Stiglitz & G. Frank Mathewson eds., 1986); P. Dasgupta & J. Stiglitz, Industrial Structure and the Nature of 
Innovative Activity, 90 ECON. J. 266 (1980); see also Uwe Cantner & Marco Guerzoni, Innovation and the 
Evolution of Industries: A Tale of Incentives, Knowledge and Needs, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON 
INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 382, 382–98 (David B. Audretsch et al., 2011); Wesley M. Cohen, 
Richard C. Levin & David C. Mowery, Firm Size and R&D Intensity: A Re-Examination, 35 J. INDUS. ECON. 
543 (1987) (finding that overall firm size has an insignificant effect on business unit R&D intensity); cf. 
RICHARD D. ROBINSON, THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY: THEORY, ISSUES, AND PRACTICE 3 
(1988) (noting the difficulty of defining units of technology, particularly for disembodied technology, i.e., 
human skill). 
 37 An excellent summary of research on the relationship between innovation and environmental 
regulation is provided in David Popp et al., Energy, the Environment, and Technological Change 4–6 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14832, 2009).  
 38 An excellent, short summary is provided in Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual 
Property Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1475 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 
2007). Another summary may be found in Joseph E. Stiglitz, Lecture, Economic Foundations of Intellectual 
Property Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 1693 (2008). 
 39 See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Evolving Innovation Paradigms and the Global Intellectual 
Property Regime, 41 CONN. L. REV. 861, 884–89 (2009); Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: 
Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467 (2008); Rebecca Tushnet, User-Generated 
Discontent: Transformation in Practice, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 497 (2008). 
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outputs are developed within firms, traded in markets, or subject to cross-firm 
collaborations that defy expectations of vertical integration or rely on unusual 
contract structures to deal with uncertainties.40 Comparatively little attention, 
by contrast, has been devoted to problems of valuation and bilateral 
contracting resulting in the illiquidity of markets for property rights in 
innovations. This has resulted in the consequent need to facilitate the 
development of such rights markets through trading exchanges (such as the 
recently created Intellectual Property Exchange International, IPXI) to better 
promote innovation and technology development and diffusion.41 
Substantial analyses now exist regarding the personal and organizational 
determinants of various forms of innovative “creativity” (i.e., “new,” 
“appropriate,” and—arguably—not “readily identifiable” outcomes) for people 
located in different settings, fields, and geographies.42 These determinants 
 
 40 See, e.g., Ashish Arora & Robert P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property Rights and Firm 
Boundaries, 13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451 (2004); Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Law and the 
Boundaries of Technology-Intensive Firms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1650–54 (2009) (citing, inter alia, 
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975); 
Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, The Management of Innovation, 109 Q.J. ECON. 1185 (1994)); Dan L. Burk, 
Intellectual Property and the Firm, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 3–4 (2004); Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The 
Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing Intellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 575, 576–78; Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm 
Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 435–36 (2009); Érica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge 
Inputs, Legal Institutions and Firm Structure: Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 101 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1123 (2007); Nicholas J. Houpt, Financing Innovation: Braiding, Monitoring, and Uncertainty, 62 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 337, 338–42 (2012); see also Anthony J. Casey, Mind Control: Firms and the Production 
of Ideas, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1061, 1062–64, 1070 (2012) (noting the failure of theory-of-the-firm 
literature to address the “how” of “idea production,” discussing the inability of property theories to explain 
such production given the difficulty of observing and controlling the products of individuals’ minds, 
identifying as relevant variables things like types of production inputs, need for collaboration, and reputational 
effects on disclosures, and suggesting that such factors may have more influence than the strength of property 
rights); David J. Teece, Business Models, Business Strategy and Innovation, 43 LONG RANGE PLAN. 172 
(2010) (identifying various methods that firms can use to capture value from innovations, such as bundling 
innovative technology into consumer-oriented products and naked licensing, and noting the dependence of 
such choices on relative perfection and enforceability of property rights). 
 41 See, e.g., Dietmar Harhoff, The Role of Patents and Licenses in Securing External Finance for 
Innovation, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 36, at 55; 
James E. Malackowski, The Next Big Thing in Monetizing IP: A Natural Progression to Exchange-Traded 
Units, LANDSLIDE, May/June 2011, at 32; Gerard Pannekoek, Emerging IP Monetization Solutions: The 
Institutionalization of an IP Exchange 4–8 (May 25, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.ipxi.com/system/files/Oxford%20IP%20Research%20Centre1.pdf; cf. Richard Bis, Financing 
Innovation: A Project Finance Approach to Funding Patentable Innovation, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Nov. 
2009, at 14, 14–17 (discussing growth in patent markets that make an invention company feasible and project 
finance desirable). See generally IPX INT’L, www.ipxi.com (last visited May, 12, 2013). 
 42 Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process: Intellectual Property Law and the Psychology 
of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999, 2002–04 (2011); see also David J. Teece, Knowledge and 
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include intrinsic and extrinsic motivations (and their interactions);43 different 
forms of collaboration, including widespread “peer production” (i.e., dispersed 
contributions);44 and convergent and divergent thinking (i.e., analytic and 
intuitive reasoning)45 for identifying and solving different kinds of problems.46 
The psychological determinants include rhetoric (principally regarding the 
“origins” of our intellectual property system) that is used to justify or challenge 
the existing norms and legal conditions for different forms of creativity, for 
example, by “valu[ing] . . . group-oriented productivity over individual 
creation.”47 
But so far these promising avenues of organizational, market, and 
psychological research regarding factors affecting innovation have not been 
developed to carefully address the questions of whether, when, and how 
particular types of creativity and innovation are promoted by the different 
 
Competence as Strategic Assets, in 1 HANDBOOK ON KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 129 (Clyde W. Holsapple 
ed., 2003) (discussing different forms of knowledge that firms may exploit for value generation, and 
differential abilities to replicate, imitate, and appropriate value from such knowledge). 
 43 Cf. Rebecca Tushnet, Naming Rights: Attribution and Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 789, 794–98 
(discussing problems of determining when the moral right of attribution should be required based on the 
relationship between authors and their works or on cultural conceptions of audiences). 
 44 See, e.g., Greg Elmer, Research Overview: Collaboration-Led Research, 37 CANADIAN J. COMM., no. 
1, 2012, at 189, 189; Georg von Krogh & Sebastian Spaeth, The Open Source Software Phenomenon: 
Characteristics That Promote Research, 16 J. STRATEGIC INFO. SYS. 236 (2007); Mandel, supra note 42, at 
2001 (“Open and collaborative peer production involves widely dispersed contributions to a project by vast 
networks of individuals working towards a common goal. These individuals may be spread across the globe, 
may rarely interact, and may not even know each other.”); Fred Gault & Eric von Hippel, The Prevalence of 
User Innovation and Free Innovation Transfers: Implications for Statistical Indicators and Innovation Policy 
(MIT Sloan Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 4722-09, 2009), available at http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/ 
handle/1721.1/65619/Fred%20and%20Eric%202009%20%202-2-09%20FDG.pdf?sequence=1. See generally 
ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION (2005); LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND 
COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY (2008). 
 45 See Mandel, supra note 42, at 2004 (“Originality often requires divergent thought processes, which 
involve significantly intuitive cognitive function, while appropriateness often requires convergent evaluation, a 
more analytic thought process. . . . Divergent ideation itself can involve either or both of two different types of 
creative thought: problem-finding and problem-solving.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 46 Id. at 2000–04; Jessica Silbey, Harvesting Intellectual Property: Inspired Beginnings and “Work-
Makes-Work,” Two Stages in the Creative Processes of Artists and Innovators, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2091, 
2093–94 (2011). 
 47 See, e.g., Jessica Silbey, Comparative Tales of Origins and Access: Intellectual Property and the 
Rhetoric of Social Change, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 195, 201 (2010). See generally James Boyle, The Second 
Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 
2003, at 33; Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual 
Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804 (2008). The described deployed narratives may be inaccurate in light of historical 
analyses of the effects of intellectual property on innovation, which suggest that creating or enhancing patent 
rights does not always promote innovation. See, e.g., Petra Moser, Patents and Innovation: Evidence from 
Economic History, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2013, at 23, 39–40. 
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forms of government funding that can occur. These analyses would have to 
address the nature, kind, and degree of innovative creativity of actors in 
different government institutions and in private or nonprofit institutions 
operating in different market structures under different regulatory regimes 
(e.g., regulated and unregulated natural and intellectual-property-created 
monopolies, oligopolies, and competitive markets; complex or simple product 
markets; and markets subject to significant or few intellectual property 
rights).48 This absence of detailed, comparative institutional evaluations is 
notable in light of the developing literature on the “new institutional 
economics.”49 
Unlike in some of my other work,50 I take no position here on whether and 
what kinds of intellectual property rights the government should create, grant, 
allow, retain, and control through these different types of funding and 
regulatory mechanisms. Intellectual property rights are not incompatible with 
most of the other government funding choices, such as direct subsidies or 
prizes, and usually are present along with them.51 Conversely, some subsidies 
that distort markets dramatically by making alternative desired innovation 
technologies more or less economical—and thus more or less viable 
 
 48 Cf. Robert M. Solow, On Macroeconomic Models of Free-Market Innovation and Growth, in 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, AND THE GROWTH MECHANISM OF THE FREE-ENTERPRISE ECONOMIES, 
supra note 13, at 15, 15 (noting the lack of joint research between macroeconomic technical-change-model 
builders and those who study behavioral economics and the history of particular innovations). See generally 
Kuznets, supra note 36, at 19 (discussing problems with performing such analyses); Fritz Machlup, The Supply 
of Inventors and Inventions, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY, supra note 6, at 143 
(discussing the non-fungibility of inventions). 
 49 See, e.g., Erik Stam & Bart Nooteboom, Entrepreneurship, Innovation and Institutions, in HANDBOOK 
OF RESEARCH ON INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 36, at 421, 421–22; cf. Douglass C. North, 
Institutional Bases for Capitalist Growth, in ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, AND THE GROWTH 
MECHANISM OF THE FREE-ENTERPRISE ECONOMIES, supra note 13, at 35, 39 (noting the difficulty of 
understanding where “beliefs, norms, and institutions come from”). See generally WILLIAMSON, supra note 40; 
Douglass C. North, The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development, in THE NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT 17 (John Harriss et al. eds., 1995); Elinor 
Ostrom, Doing Institutional Analysis: Digging Deeper than Markets and Hierarchies, in HANDBOOK OF NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 819 (Claude Menard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2005); Edward L. Rubin, 
Commentary, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1996); Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking 
Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 595 (2000). 
 50 See, e.g., Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski: History and Theory, 63 HASTINGS 
L.J. 53 (2011–2012); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Bilcare, KSR, Presumptions of Validity, Preliminary Relief, and 
Obviousness in Patent Law, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 995 (2008); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the 
Doctrine of Equivalents and Claiming the Future After Festo, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157 (2004). 
 51 See Frischmann, supra note 14, at 376 (noting the need for simultaneous institutional arrangements to 
address different types of market failures in research). 
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substitutes—may result in intellectual property rights that are wholly 
orthogonal to development or use of the innovations that are sought to be 
promoted. For one important example, consider that fossil-fuel R&D and 
consumption and production subsidies may lead to intellectual property rights 
that have no bearing on the development of renewable energy technologies, 
except regarding competitive market pricing for energy (and thus incentives to 
invest in renewable energy technology development). But eliminating fossil 
fuel subsidies and internalizing the carbon externalities imposed on society 
from fossil fuel consumption52 would reduce the creation of such intellectual 
property. More importantly, it could likely lead to more rapid greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emission reductions and development of renewable energy 
technologies than the subsidization of such alternatives directly.53 
 
 52 Many social harms from productive activities are not reflected in the market. See, e.g., Kenneth J. 
Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market Versus Nonmarket 
Allocation, in JOINT ECON. COMM., 91ST CONG., THE ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURES: 
THE PPB SYSTEM 47 (Comm. Print 1969) (explaining externalities as a subset of market failures, principally 
based on an inability to exclude small numbers of buyers and sellers in the relevant market). Given these 
“negative externalities,” liability, regulation, or taxes must be imposed on the sources of the harms to reduce 
the activity levels to more socially efficient degrees, and taxes (or marketable permits) can do so at less cost 
than direct regulation. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC OUTLAYS, AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE 178–81 (1975); 
William J. Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 307, 308–12, 319 
(1972) (citing, inter alia, JH DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRICES (1968); R. H. Coase, The Problem of 
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); A. C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (2d ed. 1924)). Note that 
taxation to internalize carbon externalities may also have substantial revenue-raising potential, which could 
then contribute to additional innovation subsidies, particularly as it may be easier to justify expenditures 
related to the purposes of the tax. See, e.g., William D. Nordhaus, Carbon Taxes to Move Toward Fiscal 
Sustainability, ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, Sept. 2010, at 1, 1–4 (proposing a carbon tax to raise revenue and noting 
numerous benefits, including moving toward meeting climate-reduction goals). 
 53 See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, REFORMING ENERGY SUBSIDIES: OPPORTUNITIES TO 
CONTRIBUTE TO THE CLIMATE CHANGE AGENDA 19 (2008), available at http://www.unep.ch/etb/publications/ 
Energy%20subsidies/EnergySubsidiesFinalReport.pdf; Doug Koplow & John Dernbach, Federal Fossil Fuel 
Subsidies and Greenhouse Gas Emissions: A Case Study of Increasing Transparency for Fiscal Policy, 26 
ANN. REV. ENERGY & ENV’T 361, 372–73 (2001); Joseph P. Tomain, “Our Generation’s Sputnik Moment”: 
Regulating Energy Innovation, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 389, 396–97, 402 (2011) (discussing the negative 
externality of dirty energy from carbon emissions and the positive externalities of clean energy as reasons to 
regulate innovation in the energy sector, and also noting the potential to divert money from fossil fuel 
subsidies to clean energy development); Michael Barrett, Finding the Money: Securing Capital for Energy 
Innovation, Remarks at the Proceedings of the Canada–United States Law Institute Henry T. King, Jr. Annual 
Conference on Energy Security and Climate Change: A Canada–United States Common Approach? (Apr. 14–
16, 2011), in 36 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 277, 293 (2012) (“Once you start building those costs [of hydrocarbon 
externalities] in [to conventional electric power projects], suddenly the economics of renewable projects start 
to look not so bad.”). See generally CEES VAN BEERS & ANDRÉ DE MOOR, PUBLIC SUBSIDIES AND POLICY 
FAILURES: HOW SUBSIDIES DISTORT THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT, EQUITY AND TRADE, AND HOW TO REFORM 
THEM (2001); Bjorn Larsen & Anwar Shah, World Fossil Fuel Subsidies and Global Carbon Emissions 
(World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 1002, 1992). 
SARNOFF GALLEYSPROOFS1 6/11/2013 9:03 AM 
1100 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1087 
Significantly, although there are many choices of government funding for 
technology innovation and diffusion, the legal-academic literature tends to 
focus on only one set from the many possible approaches, even when 
comparing that set to some of the alternatives. That set of choices is: reliance 
on private investments, creation of intellectual property rights, and market 
production with associated intellectual property rights and other forms of 
market regulation. Similarly, without much detailed analysis, governments 
around the world appear intent to make private investments, intellectual 
property rights, and ex post market production and competition regulation the 
primary approaches to developing and deploying the needed climate change 
mitigation, adaptation technologies, and energy and transportation 
infrastructure.54 Over the past few decades, the government’s focus on private 
investment has been evidenced by the relative percentage of government 
expenditures for R&D, relying on private-sector substitution.55 Nevertheless, 
government-funded R&D remains important, as reflected in recent increases in 
budget authority for it.56 
Reliance on the private sector may be based on political constraints to 
raising sufficient revenue through taxation, auctioning marketable permits, and 
creating new or expanded federal bureaucracies.57 Alternatively, such reliance 
 
 54 See, e.g., Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Patent System and Climate Change, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 301, 307 
n.30 (2011). 
 55 See, e.g., MICHAEL YAMANER, NAT’L SCI. FOUND., FEDERAL R&D SUPPORT SHOWS LITTLE CHANGE 
IN FY 2008, at 2 tbl.1 (2009); Patrick J. Clemins, Historical Trends in Federal R&D, in RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT FY 2010, at 21 (Am. Ass’n for the Advancement of Sci. ed., 2009). 
 56 See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET 
OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 365–71 (2012) [hereinafter OMB 2013 BUDGET 
REPORT], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2013/assets/spec.pdf 
(noting that the FY2013 budget provides $141 billion for R&D, representing a 1% overall increase and 5% 
increase for nondefense R&D compared to FY2012). 
 57 See, e.g., Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property and the Transfer of Green Technologies: An Essay on 
Economic Perspectives, 1 WIPO J. 133, 136 (2009); Lawrence H. Goulder & William A. Pizer, The 
Economics of Climate Change 6–7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11923, 2006); see 
also Frischmann, supra note 14, at 352 (noting scarcity of government funds as justifying more careful 
analysis of reasons to fund basic commercial research); Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 38, at 1477 
(“Probably the greatest virtue [of intellectual property] is that . . . . [n]o one is taxed more than his willingness 
to pay for any unit he buys; else he would not buy it. In contrast, funding out of general revenue runs the risk 
of imposing greater burdens on individual taxpayers than the benefits they receive.”); cf. Joshua D. Sarnoff, 
Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation of Federal Power, and the Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 205, 213 
n.37 (1997) (citing Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State 
Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1044 (1995)) (noting historic political 
obstacles to raising federal revenue and to creating a national police force, which then required default to state 
regulation); Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (but Only from a National Perspective) for Federal 
Environmental Protection, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 225, 253–54 (1997) [hereinafter Sarnoff, Continuing 
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may reflect developing public preferences for private markets over government 
involvement in directing the economy, either by direct development of factors 
of production or by picking private “winners and losers” through subsidies and 
regulation.58 
Reliance on private funding, property rights, and markets that are subject to 
government regulation to produce the desired innovation goals may arguably 
be justified in some cases by theoretical concerns. Professor Brett Frischmann 
suggested that tax mechanisms, unlike grants, should generally be used for 
commercial projects because they leave specific innovation input and output 
selection decisions to firms, which are “the best informed investor[s]” of the 
resources.59 But it is debatable whether firms will make better decisions, given 
the potential for bureaucracies to develop multi-firm expertise across projects, 
markets, and technologies.60 The approach of relying on such private funds, 
rights, and markets as a general strategy likely reflects deeply held belief 
systems regarding private markets and government regulation much more than 
carefully considered and particularized economic and political decisions.61 
 
Imperative] (citing Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?: Problems of Federalism in Mandating State 
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1201 (1977); John P. Dwyer, The 
Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183, 1192–93 (1995)) (noting revenue and 
other constraints that may lead federal administrative agencies, particularly nascent ones, to defer to state 
environmental regulation even when federal regulation would be more efficient and effective). 
 58 See, e.g., Neil B. Niman, Picking Winners and Losers in the Global Technology Race, CONTEMP. 
ECON. POL’Y, July 1995, at 77; see also STEPHEN MOORE & DEAN STANSEL, CATO INST., POLICY ANALYSIS 
225, ENDING CORPORATE WELFARE AS WE KNOW IT (1995) (“The federal government has a poor record of 
picking industrial winners and losers, so the economic benefits that these programs are purported to create 
inevitably fail to materialize. Furthermore, corporate welfare programs create an uneven playing field; foster 
an incestuous relationship between business and government; are anti-consumer, anti-capitalist, and 
unconstitutional; and create a huge drain on the federal budget.”). 
 59 Frischmann, supra note 14, at 352–53. 
 60 Cf. id. at 360 n.42, 364–66 (noting that maximizing returns on investment may not always reflect firm 
values and discussing the analogy to “Bayesian learning” in regard to ex ante variable estimates of potential 
research and product inputs of the outputs of initial R&D investment decisions). But cf. Arrow, supra note 6, at 
609, 618–19 (discussing inefficiencies of decision making resulting from exclusive rights in information). 
Further, government decisions affect the stability of taxes compared to grant mechanisms, which in turn 
influences firm investment decisions. Cf. Victor Nee & Sonja Opper, Bureaucracy and Financial Markets, 62 
KYKLOS 293, 298 (2009). See generally Paul W. Cherington et al., Organization and Research and 
Development Decision Making Within a Government Department, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE 
ACTIVITY, supra note 6 at 395. 
 61 See Frischmann, supra note 14, at 389–90 (noting that grants are easily justified for consumption 
market failures, but less easily justified—compared to intellectual property or taxes—for other market failures 
based on information signaling and decision-making differences; recognizing that even for such other market 
failures, “the government is sufficiently competent at identifying innovation types . . . amenable to market 
provision but for innovative process market failures, issuance of a grant may be a more targeted mechanism 
than alternatives and . . . . the ability for the government to monitor controllable risks . . . may be an 
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These belief systems may reflect even deeper concerns about protecting liberty 
and avoiding paternalism in regard to recognizing and forming personal 
preferences.62 As a Canadian academic noted in 2006, “[S]ince the election of 
1993, the motto seems to have been: Inside Government spending—bad, 
outside Government spending—good.”63 
B. Limits to Natural-Experiments Analyses 
Analyses of the United States’s adoption of the Bayh–Dole Act64 and the 
subsequent worldwide proliferation of similar enactments65 have looked at the 
 
advantage”). Compare, e.g., id. at 373 (arguing that government market intervention is justified only when 
markets fail to perform efficiently and should be limited to addressing specific market failures), with 
BREZNITZ, supra note 16, at 6 (describing examples of rapid, national innovation developments that were 
contingent on extensive government involvement in many aspects of national innovation markets). 
 62 See Sarnoff, Continuing Imperative, supra note 57, at 248–50 (discussing paternalism and effectuating 
jurisdictional preferences); Carol M. Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121, 1145–46 (1996) 
(reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS (1995)) 
(discussing conflicts of jurisdiction size with Tiebout’s thesis about citizen-sorting among jurisdictions to 
effectuate their preferences). See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES 
TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970); Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, 
Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 
333 (1988); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). 
 63 Brzustowski, supra note 15, at 42; see also Nymark, supra note 34, at 42 (“In Canada we have 
traditionally relied on the government sector for doing a large part of the science and technology effort. That is 
not sustainable. We have to find ways to shift the relative burden of innovation expenditures to the private 
sector—not an easy thing to do.”); Stam & Nooteboom, supra note 49, at 421 (“The popularity of a policy 
instrument is not necessarily an indication of consensus about its effectiveness, or clarity about its content.”); 
cf. Keric D. Clanahan, Drone-Sourcing? United States Air Force Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Inherently 
Governmental Functions, and the Role of Contractors, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 135, 146–47 (2012) (discussing 
extensive government reliance on private contractors, noting a preference for outsourcing that originated with 
the Eisenhower Administration, and identifying the “inherently government function” doctrine); id. at 139 
(questioning whether many tasks relating to use of unmanned aircraft are being performed by contractors “that 
should be reserved exclusively for government personnel”); Joshua Goldstein, Book Note, Searching for 
Innovation in Foreign Assistance, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Winter/Spring 2009, at 131, 131–32 (reviewing 
REINVENTING FOREIGN AID (William Easterly ed., 2008)) (discussing William Easterly’s critical comparison 
of Jeffrey Sachs and other foreign-aid planners to “Marxists, for whom ‘all countries are destined to attain the 
goal of development, meaning industrialization and a high mass standard of living, not to mention peace and 
democracy’”). But see, e.g., P. Aghion et al., Industrial Policy and Competition 2 (June 18, 2011) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1811643 (encouraging 
discussion not of whether industrial sectoral policies should exist but of how they should be designed and 
governed). 
 64 Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, §§ 201–211, 94 Stat. 3019, 3019–28 (codified as amended 
at 35 U.S.C. §§ 201–211 (2006)) [hereinafter Bayh–Dole Act]; see Stevenson–Wydler Technology Innovation 
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94 Stat. 2311 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3714 (2006)) 
[hereinafter Stevenson–Wydler Act] (addressing technology transfer from government laboratories).  
 65 See Thomas J. Siepmann, The Global Exportation of the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act, 30 U. DAYTON L. REV. 
209 (2004); cf. David S. Abrams, Did TRIPS Spur Innovation? An Analysis of Patent Duration and Incentives 
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effects of these enactments on innovation, commercialization, and 
dissemination of technologies.66 These analyses are perhaps the best-studied 
natural examples used to analyze the effects of government choices on 
innovation. They suggest that the Bayh–Dole Act and its foreign equivalents 
have led to increased university patenting and licensing, increased attraction of 
industry R&D funding for university research, and increased spinoffs.67 
This does not prove, however, that the Bayh–Dole Act actually facilitated 
greater technology transfer or greater commercialization of innovations than 
otherwise would have occurred.68 There are many reasons why granting 
 
to Innovate, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1613, 1641–42 (2009) (analyzing data to evaluate the relationship between the 
TRIPS Agreement’s heterogeneous extension of patent terms, given different processing times by field of 
technology, and the number of patent counts issued and citations to them, as a proxy for assessing innovation 
rates); Bradly J. Condon & Tapen Sinha, Climate Change and Intellectual Property Rights for New Plant 
Varieties 17 (Oct. 15, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1944593; B. 
Zorina Khan & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Of Patents and Prizes: Great Inventors in Britain and the United States, 
1750–1930, at 3–5 (Aug. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.rogerfarmer.com/NewWeb/ 
testing/AxelConference/Papers/sokoloff.pdf (analyzing natural experiments in patent systems and their effects 
on inducing inventive activity by “great inventors”). See generally Jasjeet S. Sekhon & Rocío Titiunik, When 
Natural Experiments Are Neither Natural Nor Experiments, 106 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 35 (2012). 
 66 See, e.g., DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY-
INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT IN THE UNITED STATES (2004); 
Sara Boettiger & Alan B. Bennett, Bayh-Dole: If We Knew Then What We Know Now, 24 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 320 (2006); Loet Leydesdorff & Martin Meyer, The Decline of University Patenting and the 
End of the Bayh-Dole Effect, 83 SCIENTOMETRICS 355 (2010); Anthony D. So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for 
Developing Countries? Lessons from the US Experience, 6 PLOS BIOLOGY 2078, 2079 (2008); Charles R. 
McManis & Sucheol Noh, The Impact of the Bayh-Dole Act on Genetic Research and Development: 
Evaluating the Arguments and Empirical Evidence (Wash. Univ. in St. Louis Sch. of Law Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 11-05-04, 2011). 
 67 See, e.g., WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32076, THE BAYH-DOLE ACT: SELECTED 
ISSUES IN PATENT POLICY AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF TECHNOLOGY 8–9 (2012); Margo A. Bagley, 
Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights: Putting Patents in Their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 
217–18, 233–34 (2006); David C. Mowery et al., The Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act on U.S. University 
Research and Technology Transfer, in INDUSTRIALIZING KNOWLEDGE: UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY LINKAGES IN 
JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 269, 269–70 (Lewis M. Branscomb, Fumio Kodama & Richard Florida eds., 
1999); Bhaven N. Sampat, Patenting and US Academic Research in the 20th Century: The World Before and 
After Bayh-Dole, 35 RES. POL’Y 772, 773 (2006); So et al., supra note 66, at 2079; McManis & Noh, supra 
note 66, at 12–19. 
 68 See, e.g., Dov Greenbaum, Academia to Industry Technology Transfer: An Alternative to the Bayh-
Dole System for Both Developed and Developing Nations, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
311, 378–409 (2009); cf. BUSH, supra note 16, at 31–32 (suggesting that government agencies not require 
patenting or assignment of inventions to the government but retain flexibility to compel patent assignments); 
Jay P. Kesan, Transferring Innovation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2169, 2207 (2009) (noting “overwhelming” 
evidence that university technology transfer activities that have developed in light of the Bayh-Dole Act are 
“predominantly patent-centric and revenue driven with a single-minded focus on licensing income and 
reimbursement for legal expenses,” resulting in less technology transfer “to many different sectors” than could 
otherwise occur). 
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intellectual property rights to government grant recipients may have been 
inefficient and costly to the public when promoting downstream innovation. 
Professor Frischmann has observed that—assuming a patentable invention 
results from grant funding—there is unlikely to be an expansive number of 
downstream innovations facing impediments to development that require 
government intervention. The intellectual property rights limit competition in 
the innovation market without reducing production risks, thus enhancing 
positive spillovers, hastening or subsidizing the innovation, or adding 
information about these concerns. While the grant of rights may facilitate 
licensing, it also imposes costs of reduced pre-patent dissemination, 
underutilization of the invention, and potential blocking-patent (overlapping 
rights) problems. Moreover, “the risk of foreign free-riding” is the primary 
impetus justifying continuing government intervention downstream of grant 
funding.69 
Further, it is widely believed that the Bayh–Dole Act attracted industry 
funding at the cost of changing academic norms that affect intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivations for basic research.70 The increased level of 
commercialization induced by the Bayh–Dole Act is thus sometimes used to 
argue for intellectual property rights—particularly patents—noting that 
granting private ownership of intellectual property is preferable to retained 
government development of the research prospects (at least because of the 
private funding inputs that it generates). In contrast, the change in norms is 
sometimes used to argue against such rights and to focus on concerns about 
 
 69 Frischmann, supra note 14, at 408 n.268; see id. at 407–13 (noting also the limits of domestic firm 
efforts at foreign enforcement and arguing that intellectual property is not needed in addition to grant funding 
if derivative research is patentable and is less efficient than the alternative of cooperative research—which 
enhances private capacity and builds lead-time advantage for derivative innovations—if the derivative research 
is not patentable). 
 70 See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 27; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of 
Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole 
Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 289; Arti Kaur 
Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 
77 (1999); cf. Bagley, supra note 67, at 219 n.10 (noting other social costs, including jobs and industrial 
research-fund losses from off-shoring university–industry collaborative research); Werner Bönte, What Do 
Scientists Think About Commercialization Activities?, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON INNOVATION AND 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 36, at 337, 337–53 (discussing German scientists’ attitudes, identified by a 
study of the Max Planck Institute); Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Arti K. Rai, Harnessing and Sharing the Benefits 
of State-Sponsored Research: Intellectual Property Rights and Data Sharing in California’s Stem Cell 
Initiative, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1187, 1200 (2006) (discussing concerns over restrictions on data and 
materials transfers). But see, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights 
and the Norms of Science—A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 691 (2001). 
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anti-commons and other effects that may result from such ownership.71 But 
comparatively little analysis has actually been provided regarding whether the 
reasons for such increased innovation and commercialization may have more 
to do with the comparative internal cultures, expertise, and various motivations 
of the actors in private firms, universities, and government agencies, and less 
to do with the legal regime allocating rights and regulating the markets. 
Institutional culture is notoriously difficult to analyze,72 expertise is hard to 
measure,73 and motivation is hard to observe—particularly as it may be 
unconscious.74 
Moreover, decisions regarding government innovation funding-mechanism 
choice may be “idiosyncratic” in that they may not fit within a general 
economic framework for comparing means of technology inducement.75 For 
example, good analyses of international technology transfer mechanisms are 
developing that demonstrate these mechanisms’ complex relationships to, inter 
alia, project size, number of projects, trade, foreign direct investment, 
intellectual property rights, economic and regulatory environments, human 
capital, level of education, R&D funding, natural resources, and patterns of 
 
 71 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1059, 1084–85 (2008); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca 
S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, SCI., May 1998, at 
698, 698–99; Kieff, supra note 70, at 692, 704–05; Arti Kaur Rai, Evolving Scientific Norms and Intellectual 
Property Rights: A Reply to Kieff, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 707, 710 (2001); see also Jeremy M. Grushcow, 
Measuring Secrecy: A Cost of the Patent System Revealed, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 59, 82–83 (2004) (finding that 
academic patenting may have delayed research publication, increasing risks of wasteful duplication of 
research); cf. Paul A. David, Mitigating “Anticommons” Harms to Research in Science and Technology: New 
Moves in “Legal Jujitsu” Against Unintended Adverse Consequences of the Exploitation of Intellectual 
Property Rights on Results of Publicly and Privately Funded Research, 2 WIPO J. 59, 62–63 (2010) 
(summarizing studies of royalty stacking and other anticommons effects in various industries and scientific 
research). See generally MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS 
MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (2008). 
 72 See, e.g., Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture, 45 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 109, 111–12 (1990) (noting 
problems of definition, of levels of manifestation—artifacts, values, and underlying assumptions—and of 
deciphering content); Linda Smircich, Concepts of Culture and Organizational Analysis, 28 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 
339, 339 (1983) (“The culture concept has been borrowed from anthropology, where there is no consensus on 
its meaning. It should be no surprise that there is also variety in its application to organization studies.”). See 
generally MARCEL DANESI & PAUL PERRON, ANALYZING CULTURES: AN INTRODUCTION & HANDBOOK 
(1999); W. Gibb Dyer Jr., Culture in Organizations: A Case Study and Analysis (MIT Sloan Sch. of Mgmt., 
Working Paper No. 1279-82, 1982). 
 73 See, e.g., DEVELOPMENT OF PROFESSIONAL EXPERTISE: TOWARD MEASUREMENT OF EXPERT 
PERFORMANCE AND DESIGN OF OPTIMAL LEARNING ENVIRONMENTS (K. Anders Ericsson ed., 2009). 
 74 See, e.g., DAVID C. MCCLELLAND, HUMAN MOTIVATION 15–30, 43–48 (1987). 
 75 Timothy J. Brennan et al., Prizes, Patents, and Technology Procurement: A Proposed Analytical 
Framework 6 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 11–21, 2011).  
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production.76 But the factors at issue may ultimately be country- and culture-
specific. 
In summary, we do not know very much yet about important issues that 
should inform our decisions. We do not know: what government innovation 
choices have actually been made, their results, and their effectiveness across a 
number of dimensions; why we have made those choices; how those choices 
might compare to alternatives; what factors influence the comparative 
effectiveness of those choices; and the extent to which those factors are driven 
by particular cultural considerations that may be subject to manipulation. We 
also do not know much about how to mediate political disputes or hurdles to 
adopting particular choices, which might in turn affect cultural norms and 
further inflect comparative effectiveness. 
C. The Need for Better Analyses and Three General Proposals to Help 
Perform Them 
Given the limits to the analyses described above, we desperately need 
better analyses of the determinants of the differences in outcomes.77 This likely 
may be possible only by carefully analyzing particular institutions and trying to 
 
 76 See, e.g., DOMINIQUE FORAY, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., ISSUE PAPER NO. 23, 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN THE TRIPS AGE: THE NEED FOR NEW TYPES OF PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN THE 
LEAST DEVELOPED AND MOST ADVANCED ECONOMIES 4–7 (2009) (providing a typology of technology 
transfer and noting limits to transfer by foreign direct investment and infrastructure creation); Gisèle Schmid, 
Technology Transfer in the Clean Development Mechanism: The Role of Host Country Characteristics 2–4, 
21–22 (Univ. of Geneva Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 12021, 2012); Dany Bahar, Ricardo 
Hausmann & César A. Hidalgo, International Knowledge Diffusion and the Comparative Advantage of 
Nations 4–5 (Harvard Kennedy Sch. Faculty Research Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 12-020, 
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2087607 (noting that knowledge diffusion and technology transfer 
may require direct human interactions and identifying a new measure of such diffusion, i.e., the emergence of 
new export technologies relative to exports from geographically proximate countries); Lee Branstetter, 
Raymond Fisman & C. Fritz Foley, Do Stronger Intellectual Property Rights Increase International 
Technology Transfer? Empirical Evidence from U.S. Firm-Level Data 16–28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 11516, 2005) (analyzing relationships between intellectual property rights, multinational 
corporation foreign-affiliate R&D, technology transfers, and R&D spending). See generally KEITH E. MASKUS, 
INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., ISSUE PAPER NO. 7, ENCOURAGING INTERNATIONAL 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (2004); Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging 
Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 109 (1998). 
 77 I am limiting analysis to innovation outcomes. Measuring overall outcomes of R&D and innovation 
policies on society is even more complex. See generally STEVE OLSON & STEPHEN MERRILL, NAT’L ACAD. OF 
SCI., MEASURING THE IMPACTS OF FEDERAL INVESTMENTS IN RESEARCH: A WORKSHOP SUMMARY 7–17 
(2011) (noting limitations of performance measures for answering policy questions, contingency of such 
measures on complementary policies, incompatibility of and tradeoffs among performance measures, and 
failure of measurable quantities to capture important outcomes—including the benefits of failures in 
redirecting R&D and the inability to capture internal system dynamics in performance measures). 
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conduct experiments with comparable institutions where different approaches 
are tried simultaneously (recognizing that adequate controls for such 
experiments may not exist). Rare natural experiments may sometimes 
demonstrate causal effects, but they cannot support analysis of whether 
alternatives not chosen would have led to better outcomes. As one commenter 
has noted regarding the Bayh–Dole debates, analysis is “inextricably 
encumbered by the problem of documenting a counterfactual assertion of the 
form: if we had not do[ne] that, the world would now be different.”78 The 
analogy here to federalism theory and the need for laboratories of democracy is 
apt.79 Moreover, given that the rights and markets at issue may be national or 
international in scope,80 it will require both adjustments to domestic laws—
national and subnational laws—as well as amendments to international trade 
and intellectual property treaties to permit the necessary international or 
domestic segmentation of markets for the needed experimentation to occur.81 
A better understanding needs to be developed soon. The current state of 
analysis is rudimentary, massive amounts of money will be spent on climate 
change and infrastructure innovation, and the outcomes of funding choices are 
very important. The three proposals suggested here would help improve 
evaluations of such choices and consequently help government decision 
making regarding them in the first instance. These proposals are: (1) better 
tracking of government-innovation expenditure decisions and their outcomes; 
(2) self-conscious and documented legislative and agency decision making 
 
 78 Paul A. David, The Economic Logic of “Open Science” and the Balance Between Private Property 
Rights and the Public Domain in Scientific Data and Information: A Primer 16 (Stanford Inst. for Econ. Policy 
Research, Discussion Paper No. 02-30, 2003). 
 79 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 80 Compare, e.g., Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 
41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 910–14 (1994) (noting a relatively uniform public and national decision-making 
process within the United States), with Robert F. Nagel, The Term Limits Dissent: What Nerve, 38 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 843, 845–47, 855 (1996) (challenging that argument based on the lack of preemptive legislation and 
Supreme Court decisions to overturn legislation). 
 81 I am indebted to Peter Yu for this point, particularly in regard to the need to make adjustments to 
national treatment and nondiscrimination obligations under the Government Procurement Agreement. See 
Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 4(b), 1915 U.N.T.S. 103 [hereinafter GPA]; cf. S. James Boumil III, Comment, China’s 
Indigenous Innovation Policies Under the TRIPS and GPA Agreements and Alternatives for Promoting 
Economic Growth, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 755, 773–77 (2012) (discussing TRIPS and GPA concerns with Chinese 
indigenous innovation procurement policies). Note that some countries, including the United States, exclude 
R&D from their commitments under the GPA. See Appendices and Annexes to the GPA, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/appendices_e.htm (last visited May 12, 2013). 
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regarding expenditure form choices; and (3) controlled experiments that go 
beyond existing natural experiments.82 
Better tracking of the choices of mechanisms for government innovation 
expenditures and their outcomes will permit better understanding of how the 
money was spent and what innovation outputs resulted. At least since 2008, as 
a result of the adoption in 2006 of the Transparency Act,83 U.S. government 
agencies have been required to track their awards of at least $25,000. The 
reporting targets include procurement contracts, grants, loans, and other 
expenditures, and thus include most innovation funding inputs—even if not 
broken down as such. Further, this data has been reported electronically, which 
permits aggregation and data analysis.84 Government agencies also track their 
budget authority for R&D,85 but they rarely track the innovation outputs from 
such inputs in a manner that would permit comparative analysis. 
The most extensive data on R&D and innovation funding by government is 
compiled by the National Science Foundation (NSF) through its Federal Funds 
Survey.86 This survey data provides funding input information reported by 
government agencies by type of performer (i.e., the organization doing the 
work) and plant (i.e., facilities), but does not include clandestine R&D, is not 
verified outside the reporting agency, contains estimates that are encouraged 
where actual data is not available, and (most significantly) does not contain 
relevant output measures.87 These surveys lack numerous details, are provided 
after the fact, may not separate research from development, and may not be 
 
 82 Cf. Michael J. Madison et al., Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. 
REV. 657, 676–77 (2010) (discussing a three-pronged approach to implement an Institutional Analysis and 
Development framework, which includes a taxomony of practices, the identification of variables, and 
preserving flexibility of reponses).  
 83 Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-282, 120 Stat. 1186 
(codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 6101 (2006)). 
 84 The compiled data is made available to the public at USASPENDING.GOV, http://www.usaspending.gov/ 
(last visited May 12, 2013). 
 85 See, e.g., OMB 2013 Budget Report, supra note 56, at 370–71. 
 86 See Survey of Federal Funds for Research and Development, NAT’L SCI. FOUND., http://www.nsf.gov/ 
statistics/srvyfedfunds/ (last visited May 12, 2013) [hereinafter NSF Survey]; see also Federal Funds for R&D, 
NAT’L SCI. FOUND., http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/fedfunds/ (last visited May 12, 2013) (tracking budget 
obligations). 
 87 See NSF Survey, supra note 86; see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH AND 
INNOVATION INDICATORS: REPORT OF A WORKSHOP 3 (Ronald S. Cooper & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 1997) 
(noting the difficulty of measuring innovation outputs). 
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able to be accessed except at aggregate levels due to confidentiality concerns, 
which precludes policy analysis in real time.88 
In contrast, some recent efforts are being developed by federal agencies to 
track and measure the innovation outputs of federal funding inputs, although 
participation in reporting is currently voluntary.89 Further, some voluntarily 
reported innovation output data—on product creation, organizational creation 
(startups), intellectual property filings and grants, and licensing formation and 
revenue—is compiled annually by the Association of University Technology 
Managers (AUTM).90 This data is collected from U.S. and Canadian 
institutions—principally universities, colleges, and hospitals, but also a few 
national laboratories and third-party technology investment firms—and 
includes government research funding inputs.91 However, such data is not 
mandatory or subject to confirmation and does not include much important 
information regarding outputs (e.g., patent licensing efforts and license 
terms).92 Thus, data on licensing and other transfers of technology may not be 
available and must be estimated, both in these countries and worldwide.93 As 
others have noted, moreover, the lack of such data may significantly affect the 
marketability of the technologies.94 
Some power to compel reporting of innovation outputs (including licensing 
activity and terms) already exists for federally funded research subject to the 
 
 88 See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT DATA NEEDS: PROCEEDINGS OF 
A WORKSHOP 3, 7, 12, 15 (Bronwyn H. Hall & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2005).  
 89 See What is Star Metrics?, STAR METRICS, https://www.starmetrics.nih.gov/ (last visited May 12, 
2013) (noting various innovation output measures that include job creation, scientific knowledge measures 
such as publications and citations, social outcome measures such as health outcomes and environmental 
impacts, workforce outcome measures such as student mobility and employment, and economic growth 
measures such as patents and start-ups). The STAR METRICS effort—Science and Technology for America’s 
Reinvestment: Measuring the Effect of Research on Innovation, Competitiveness and Science—is led by the 
National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, and the White House Office of Science and 
Technology Policy. Id. 
 90 See, e.g., AUTM Licensing Activity Survey: FY2011, ASS’N U. TECH. MANAGERS, http://www.autm. 
net/FY_2011_Licensing_Activity_Survey/8730.htm (last visited May 12, 2013).  
 91 See, e.g., id.; see also Richard A. Jensen, Startup Firms from Research in U.S. Universities, in 
HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 36, at 273, 273–76 (analyzing 
AUTM data from 1993–2004 and noting other studies using AUTM data). 
 92 See, e.g., AUTM U.S. Survey, supra note 90.  
 93 See, e.g., Harhoff, supra note 41, at 60 (discussing various estimates of world markets for technology, 
including royalty and licensing revenues, sales of patent rights, and effects of transfer pricing). 
 94 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Nathan Myhrvold, How to Make a Patent Market, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
257, 258 (2007) (noting that “publication of patent assignment and license terms” would make a huge 
difference to developing markets for patents). 
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Bayh–Dole Act.95 In addition to the statutorily required reporting obligations 
that assure disclosures of inventions and related patenting activities,96 implicit 
authority likely exists to require disclosures of licensing efforts and terms to 
determine whether to exercise march-in rights or use the statutory license 
authority.97 Additional power to compel disclosures of federally funded 
innovation outputs or federally granted intellectual property rights could 
readily be created by new legislation without triggering any concern for 
regulatory takings (and certainly not if done prospectively). As noted in 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto,98 federal benefits may be conditioned on the 
disclosure of trade secrets, and no compensable taking occurs when a private 
party agrees to accept the benefits with such conditions.99 Of course, such 
legislation could protect trade secrecy while permitting useful data gathering 
and analysis. 
By creating requirements for affirmative and intentional government 
choices and reporting regarding these mechanisms (and assuming honest 
disclosures), the reasons why the money went to the specific inputs can be 
known. This may help both to avoid automatic default to potentially costly and 
relatively ineffective “business as usual” approaches and allow for 
commencement of the process of analyzing the fit—or lack thereof—between 
decisions and outcomes. The premise of an extensive environmental literature 
regarding impact statements is that requiring ex ante consideration of 
alternatives leads to better decision making and policy outcomes.100 
 
 95 See 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(1), (5) (2006).  
 96 Id. 
 97 35 U.S.C. §§ 202(c)(4), 203 (2006); cf. MATTHEW RIMMER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE: INVENTING CLEAN TECHNOLOGIES 283 (2011) (citing Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Comment, 
Addressing the Green Patent Global Deadlock Through Bayh-Dole Reform, 119 YALE L.J. 1727 (2010)) 
(noting the ability to change patenting and licensing defaults and the terms of access for federally funded 
technologies). 
 98 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984). 
 99 See id. at 1007–08. So long as the trade secret rights are not destroyed, the information should retain 
substantial value and thus should not result in a regulatory taking even if the requirement for disclosure of 
information to the government is imposed retroactively. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 
528, 539 (2005) (“[T]he complete elimination of a property's value is the determinative factor.”); Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978) (noting that Supreme Court cases “uniformly reject 
the proposition that diminution in property value, standing alone, can establish a ‘taking’”). 
 100 See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (2006)); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 
349 (1989); cf. Mark Squillace & Alexander Hood, NEPA, Climate Change, and Public Lands Decision 
Making, 42 ENVTL. L. 469, 481–85, 510–25 (2012) (discussing the need for quantitation and pricing of outputs 
to permit cumulative impacts assessment in regard to federal land’s greenhouse gas emissions, and proposing 
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Some analysts have noted the need for better decision making and 
management within government energy innovation institutions by clarifying 
their mission, attracting better leadership, “cultivating an entrepreneurial and 
competitive culture[,] setting up a structure and management system that 
balances independence and accountability[,] and ensuring stable, predictable 
funding.”101 They have also noted that predictable, long-term funding will 
permit greater experimentation with alternative research pathways,102 and they 
have identified the lack of fit between institutions that make R&D decisions 
and incentives for commercial deployment of technologies.103 Perhaps most 
importantly, they have acknowledged that for the types of government funding 
directed at the private sector “there is no apparent rationale or strategy behind 
the choices made regarding what type of relationships . . . should be used in 
different cases . . . [and] DOE documents show no evidence of any high-level 
analysis or planning for optimizing interactions with the private sector.”104 
This is simply shocking, given both the amount of money at issue and the 
needs that such funding is supposed to address. It will only get worse if 
extrapolated beyond the United States and the energy context to global efforts 
to address climate change. 
Finally, creating various non-natural experiments may provide 
understanding as to what works better, when, and why. Such “controlled 
environment” experiments can help reveal which approaches perform better in 
particular, comparative circumstances.105 Significantly, such better 
understanding will require multiple kinds of experiments employing different 
funding mechanisms in different national and institutional cultures to develop a 
meaningful body of information to analyze. To do so may sometimes require 
segmentation of markets within international regions or particular nations, 
which in turn may require amending treaty laws to permit restriction of 
 
rules to hold agencies more accountable). See generally SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK: 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM (1984). 
 101 ANADON ET AL., supra note 34, at 2; see Mark Radka, Some Perspectives About the Climate 
Technology Centre/Climate Technology Network, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION CLIMATE 
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/application/pdf/some_perspectives_ 
about_the_ctc_ctn.pdf (last visited May 12, 2013) (discussing ten similar factors that lead to successful 
technology centers). 
 102 See, e.g., ANADON ET AL., supra note 34, at 2. 
 103 See, e.g., id. at 1–2. 
 104 Id. at 3. 
 105 Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose, The Effects of Economic Regulation, in 2 HANDBOOK OF 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 36, at 1449, 1461; see id. at 1461–62 (discussing different types of 
controlled experiments). 
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government funding to regional or domestic private entities.106 In particular, 
these experiments might measure both the timing and quality of the innovation 
outputs induced by various types of funding mechanisms chosen for the 
different markets. 
Creating these types of national or subnational experiments, moreover, will 
not necessarily conflict with efforts to promote substantive harmonization of 
“best practices” for the content of national laws within the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) TRIPS regime,107 the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) treaty complex,108 or other intergovernmental fora. An 
inadequate theoretical understanding exists regarding optimal intellectual 
property and other innovation-related laws. Much of the current international 
effort at harmonization either reproduces the default to untested beliefs in 
greater reliance on either private markets or government regulation, or reflects 
the exercise of raw political power and trade efforts to promote comparative 
national advantages.109 Accordingly, the proposed experimentation may 
actually promote harmonization by providing reasons to harmonize at 
particular levels of national law protection.110 
 
 106 Intellectual property rights are based on national laws, whereas relevant product markets may be 
international in scope. Although some experiments may therefore permit private entities to compete for both 
national rights and international markets for intermediate and ultimate innovation outputs, such winner-take-all 
experiments may hide useful information regarding comparative effectiveness. Accordingly, by segmenting 
markets, different approaches can be tried simultaneously. Of course, such segmented markets may sometimes 
not reach sufficient scale to induce the desired innovation outputs. Careful thought will therefore be needed 
regarding how to design useful,  non-natural experiments. 
 107 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS 
Agreement]. 
 108 See, e.g., Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as revised at 
Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. 
 109 See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of 
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 42–45 (2004). See generally SUSAN K. 
SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003). 
 110 There is an extensive but highly contested economic, corporate, financial, environmental, public 
choice, international relations, and constitutional literature on federalism and race-to-the-bottom and race-to-
the-top effects of competitive experimentation within or across jurisdictions. This literature bears citation but 
not elaboration here. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” 
and Is It “to the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental 
Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 629–33 (1996); Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local 
Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 
VA. L. REV. 265, 274–90 (1990); Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition Among 
Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 333 (1988); Richard L. Revesz, 
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal 
Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1213–21, 1239–53 (1992); Sarnoff, Continuing 
Imperative, supra note 57, at 278–85; Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International 
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Even if domestic laws are adopted and international treaties are modified to 
permit these proposals for tracking, decision-making documentation, and 
experimentation, it may still be difficult to disentangle the relationships among 
government funding choices, comparative outcomes, institutional and national 
cultural considerations, and simple fortuity or serendipity.111 In the end, the 
choices may have to be “muddle[d] through” based on inadequate theoretical 
and empirical guidance, a limited set of values, and historic experiences.112 
The next Part of this Article provides a classification of government 
choices of innovation funding mechanisms. The classification is admittedly 
idiosyncratic, but it has the benefit of clearly highlighting the possible major 
differences of approach and the substantial similarities among approaches 
across a number of dimensions. Legislators, administrators, and law treaty 
negotiators and implementers may want to pay particular attention to the broad 
range of options the next Part describes, in order to avoid conceptual default to 
a narrower set of options that may be less effective. Many options may require 
the creation of new institutions or bureaucracies, or the adaptation of existing 
institutions and bureaucracies for effective implementation. Critically, 
understanding the choices may generate the recognition that path dependence 
is not inevitable.113 
Before turning to the classification, it bears noting that efforts to better 
understand how to effectively promote technology development and transfer to  
 
 
Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2059 (1993); Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to 
Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. (SYMPOSIUM ISSUE) 67, 75, 80–87 (1996); Tiebout, supra note 62; see also Daniel B. Rodriguez, 
Turning Federalism Inside Out: Intrastate Aspects of Interstate Regulatory Competition, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. (SYMPOSIUM ISSUE) 149, 151–52 (1996) (noting in-state differences that affect racing); Stewart, supra 
note 57, at 1211 & n.65 (describing the race to the bottom as a manifestation of the “Tragedy of the 
Commons”). 
 111 Cf. Madison et al., supra note 82, at 680 (identifying the goal of commons-based analysis as 
determining success or failure as a function of context). 
 112 Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79 (1959); see also 
Charles E. Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, 39 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 517 (1979). 
 113 Cf. Tomain, supra note 53, at 396 (arguing that “[b]ecause clean energy and climate change present 
categorically different regulatory challenges, the regulatory responses must also be categorically different as 
well”); see also id. at 399–400 (discussing how firms’ “locked-in” needs to recoup investments, organizational 
culture, and path-dependent commitments to past forms of investment and business decisions tend toward 
incremental advances rather than new and creative innovation). 
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address climate change may not fully address the serious fiscal constraints that 
exist and the distributional justice and other moral and ethical concerns114 that 
will continue to affect such activities.115 As has previously been noted, 
financial constraints dramatically affected technology development, 
substitution, and transfer obligations to developing countries under the 
Montreal Protocol.116 
Efforts at acquiring substitute technology [have] not been successful 
as the technologies are covered by IPRs [intellectual property rights], 
and are inaccessible either on account of the high price quoted by the 
technology suppliers and/or due to the conditions laid down by the 
suppliers. This would require domestically owned firms to give up 
their majority equity holding through joint ventures or to agree to 
export restrictions in order to gain access to the alternative 
technology. 
Financial assistance towards the acquisition of such technology 
has also not been effective. In fact, an interim progress report by the 
Executive Committee on technology transfer stated that the terms of 
freely negotiated transfer of technologies, including costs such as 
patents, designs and royalties, may not always be accommodated by 
the funding policies of the Multilateral Fund. Thus, while prices of 
alternative technologies are unaffordable on account of IPRs, access 
to these is limited due to inadequate funds domestically and lack of 
financial assistance from the Multilateral Fund, creating a major 
 
 114 See, e.g., INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, BEYOND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROTECTING 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN A CLIMATE-CONSTRAINED WORLD 19–32 (2011), available at http://www.ichrp.org/files/ 
reports/65/138_ichrp_climate_tech_transfer_report.pdf; Thomas Alured Faunce & Hitoshi Nasu, Normative 
Foundations of Technology Transfer and Transnational Benefit Principles in the UNESCO Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, 34 J. MED. & PHIL. 296 (2009). 
 115 See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual Property 
Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 978 (2012) (arguing that intellectual property rights are “in significant 
tension with distributive values” because they use “price to ration access to information goods” and “the 
existing distribution of resources may be unjust”); Stiglitz, supra note 38, at 1697 (“[F]inancing research 
through monopoly profits may be neither the most efficient nor the most equitable way of doing so.”); id. at 
1715 (“[Intellectual property rights] will (effectively) recognize differences in elasticities of demand (because 
the monopolist can extract more profits when demand is less elastic), but not any other circumstances, and 
therefore inherently represents an inequitable way of financing research. The bottom line is that raising 
revenues for financing research through the granting of monopoly power cannot be justified by any generally 
accepted principles of public finance.”).  
 116 See Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer arts. 10, 10A, Sept 16, 1987, 1522 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
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hurdle in transiting to ODS [ozone depleting substance] friendly 
production, especially among producer nations.117 
These concerns will be correspondingly greater for climate-change mitigation 
and adaptation than for stratospheric ozone protection, as the number of 
technologies implicated for development and transfer—whether already in the 
public domain,118 owned by many companies that are willing to sell at 
reasonable prices under reasonable conditions,119 or owned by companies that 
are unwilling to transfer them except at high costs or on unreasonable 
conditions120—and the costs associated with them will be substantially larger. 
These distributional and ethical concerns will be further exacerbated by 
existing (and likely future skewed and clustered)121 national patterns of clean 
technology development, patenting, and ownership.122 
 
 117 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES OF MULTILATERAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: A PACKAGE OF TRADE MEASURES AND POSITIVE MEASURES 45–46 (Veena 
Jha & Ulrich Hoffmann eds., 2000); see also MARTIN KHOR, IPRS, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE 4–6 (2009), available at www.un.org/esa/policy/devplan/egm_climatechange/khor.pdf; Sarnoff, 
supra note 54, at 326–27. See generally STEPHEN O. ANDERSEN ET AL., TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FOR THE 
OZONE LAYER: LESSONS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE (2007). 
 118 See, e.g., JOHN H. BARTON, CHATHAM HOUSE, ENERGY, ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAMME PAPER 08/02, MITIGATING CLIMATE CHANGE THROUGH TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: ADDRESSING 
THE NEEDS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2008) (discussing the transfer of existing transportation 
technologies). 
 119 See, e.g., JOHN H. BARTON, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., ISSUE PAPER NO. 2, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO CLEAN ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: AN 
ANALYSIS OF SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC, BIOFUEL AND WIND TECHNOLOGIES 11–14 (2007) (discussing renewable 
energy technologies).  
 120 See, e.g., supra notes 116–17 and accompanying text (discussing ozone depletion technologies). 
Breakthrough climate change mitigation or adaptation technologies, such as carbon capture and some 
renewable energy technologies, would likely be subject to intellectual property rights and have few meaningful 
substitutes. Cf. LEE ET AL., supra note 5, at 21–43 (comparing patent landscapes of various renewable energy 
and carbon capture technologies); Tomain, supra note 53, at 390–91 (discussing the current costs of carbon 
capture given existing technologies); Mohammed Al-Juaied & Adam Whitmore, Realistic Costs of Carbon 
Capture (Belfer Ctr. for Sci. & Int’l Affairs, Discussion Paper 2009-08, 2009), available at http://belfercenter. 
ksg.harvard.edu/files/2009_AlJuaied_Whitmore_Realistic_Costs_of_Carbon_Capture_web.pdf. Developing 
breakthrough technologies also may be a more efficient international regulatory strategy than treaty regimes 
focused on emissions reduction. See, e.g., Scott Barrett, Climate Treaties and “Breakthrough” Technologies, 
96 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 22 (2006). 
 121 See MICHAEL E. PORTER, CLUSTERS OF INNOVATION: REGIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF U.S. 
COMPETITIVENESS (2001); JONATHAN SALLET ET AL., SCI. PROGRESS, THE GEOGRAPHY OF INNOVATION: THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE GROWTH OF REGIONAL INNOVATION CLUSTERS 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.scienceprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/eda_paper.pdf; Mercedes Delgado et al., 
Clusters, Convergence, and Economic Performance 1 (Aug. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.isc.hbs.edu/pdf/DPS_ClustersPerformance_08-20-10.pdf; see also Pontus Braunerhjelm, 
Entrepreneurship, Innovation and Economic Growth: Interdependencies, Irregularities and Regularities, in 
HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 36, at 161, 185–93; Maryann 
P. Feldman & Gil Avnimelech, Knowledge Spillovers and the Geography of Innovation—Revisited: A 20 
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II. A TAXONOMY OF GOVERNMENT INNOVATION FUNDING MECHANISMS 
Using a broad brush for classification, government choices to fund 
innovation can be grouped into five categories: (a) subsidization; (b) 
procurement; (c) direct development; (d) constructed commons; and (e) 
product, process, and market regulation.123 In 2000, one American professor 
identified five categories of choices that are somewhat narrower but overlap in 
large part those just described: reliance on the “naked market”; markets and 
intellectual property rights; markets and R&D tax incentives; subsidies; and 
procurement.124 In 2001, another American professor identified five slightly 
different categories of government innovation-funding action: direct 
development of technology; subsidization of private entities (particularly of 
university research); post hoc prizes or other rewards; government laws that 
assist concealment of private information; and conferring intellectual property 
rights.125 In 2008, a Nobel Prize winning economist supplied a three-part 
 
Years’ Perspective on the Field on Geography of Innovation, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON INNOVATION 
AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 36, at 150; Alessandra Fogli & Laura Veldkamp, Germs, Social Networks 
and Growth 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18470, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1679857 (discussing effects and persistence of historic 
social structures on productivity). See generally CHARLES W. WESSNER, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
GROWING INNOVATION CLUSTERS FOR AMERICAN PROSPERITY: SUMMARY OF A SYMPOSIUM (2011); Daniel 
Gervais, Of Clusters and Assumptions: Innovation as Part of a Full TRIPS Implementation, 77 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2353, 2363–69 (2009). 
 122 See Sarnoff, supra note 54, at 318–19 (citing, inter alia, ANTOINE DECHEZLEPRÊTRE ET AL., 
INVENTION AND TRANSFER OF CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES ON A GLOBAL SCALE: A STUDY 
DRAWING ON PATENT DATA 4 (2008); INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., PATENTS AND CLEAN 
ENERGY: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN EVIDENCE AND POLICY 9, 30–36 (2010)). However, counterpressures 
may be exerted from developed countries that find their technology development restricted by foreign patents. 
See, e.g., Daniel R. Cahoy, Inverse Enclosure: Abdicating the Green Technology Landscape, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 
805 (2012).  
 123 Cf. Madison et al., supra note 82, at 667 (discussing “direct or indirect provisioning by the public 
sector using a combination of grants to researchers; tax credits or subsidies to researchers and enterprises that 
employ them; prizes; and production and distribution of knowledge and innovation by the government . . . by 
organizing research enterprises or by purchasing and distributing private research”). Another recent 
classification and comparative analysis discussed five “public innovation policies,” which are: intellectual 
property rights; R&D subsidies; tax incentives; prizes and contests; and public procurement and production. 
See Tuomas Takalo, Rationales and Instruments for Public Innovation Policies 10–19 (Bank of Finland 
Research Discussion Papers, Paper No. 1, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2217502 (discussing each category and tradeoffs of the various approaches). 
 124 See Frischmann, supra note 14, at 354; cf. id. at 387 (lumping government direct development with 
subsidization). In regard to procurement, the government both creates a new market for innovation and acts in 
a double role within that market, as a purchaser on behalf of the pubic and as an investor. See id. at 374 n.102. 
 125 See William Fisher, Intellectual Property and Innovation: Theoretical, Empirical, and Historical 
Perspectives 2–3 (May 2, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/ 
Innovation.pdf. 
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categorization—patents, prizes, and government-funded research—and 
focused on six attributes of these three choices: selection of research targets; 
financing methods; dissemination incentives; nature of the risks; innovation 
incentives; and transaction costs.126 More recently, another American professor 
focused on a two-part basic categorization of “indirect subsidies through tax 
expenditure or market regulation through other tax policies, or direct spending 
on innovation either through direct employment or through a system of grants, 
rewards or prizes for creators and inventors.”127 
The categories I have chosen emphasize what I believe are the 
fundamentally different approaches to funding innovation and cover a broader 
range of subsidies and market regulation measures than are found in most other 
categorization schemes. The categorization may also help demonstrate the 
similarities and differences among the various approaches. As discussed 
further below, specific measures within these categories could fall into 
multiple categories, and thus the choices of “location”—for describing various 
measures within the various categories—are both idiosyncratic and not 
mutually exclusive. Definitional problems affect categorization, and the 
multiplicity of mechanisms that can be and are used makes any categorization 
scheme necessarily somewhat arbitrary and likely incomplete.128 Further, it 
bears emphasizing that adopting multiple simultaneous approaches risks 
wasting limited government resources on ineffective efforts to promote 
innovation and on over-rewarding investors and private firms at the public’s 
expense.129 But it certainly helps to recognize the diversity of choices so as to 
improve analyses of their effects and make more informed collective decisions. 
A. Subsidies 
Subsidization is a very broad class that has different comparative effects on 
innovation.130 The most basic form of subsidy to R&D and innovation is (1) 
direct and targeted subsidization of R&D and innovation efforts, such as 
government agency funding of university, corporate, or small business R&D, 
 
 126 See Stiglitz, supra, note 38, at 1722.  
 127 Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for Tailoring Intellectual Property 
Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1368 (2009). 
 128 See Jerome S. Gabig, Jr., Federal Research Grants: Who Owns the Intellectual Property?, 9 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 640 (1986). 
 129 See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 14, at 385. 
 130 See OECD, NATIONAL SYSTEMS FOR FINANCING INNOVATION 11–12 (1995). 
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and government support for education more broadly.131 Other subsidies 
include: (2)  prizes, rewards, and other ex post funding; (3) consumption or 
production subsidies; (4) tax subsidies; (5) administrative subsidies; and (6) 
foreign aid. 
1. Direct Subsidies 
Direct subsidy funds may be provided through direct agreements, 
cooperative research agreements, and other funding vehicles.132 They are 
typically provided ex ante without regard to whether they generate any specific 
kind or amount of innovation.133 But direct subsidy funds potentially can be 
provided (usually in predetermined amounts) ex post to R&D and innovation 
efforts and may be conditioned upon generating particular outputs or quantities 
of outputs. If provided ex post and conditionally, such direct subsidies look 
much like prizes—the next type of subsidy mechanism. Similarly, direct 
subsidies to R&D or innovation may look a lot like procurement of R&D or 
innovation that is not linked to procurement of subsequent products.134 As with 
procurement, such subsidies may fail to result in the anticipated R&D or 
innovation outputs, or they may be made conditional upon achieving ultimate 
outputs or on achieving intermediate outputs (as with progress payments). 
 
 131 See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 14, at 387 (noting subsidies to nonprofit institutions and, less 
frequently, to private firms, and discussing development of reasons for such funding through political 
processes, expert bureaucracies, and solicitations from researchers). 
 132 See id. at 388 & nn.178, 183 (noting that direct subsidies include cash assistance, loans, loan 
guarantees, and insurance, and that cooperative agreements—rather than grants—are to be used for greater 
government involvement in the innovation R&D). 
 133 See Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, § 2, 100 Stat. 1785, 1785–87 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 3710a (2006)) (permitting Cooperative R&D Agreements (CRADAs) to 
allow government laboratories to negotiate licenses for use of government-owned inventions and to create a 
consortium for technology transfer); cf. Frischmann, supra note 14, at 367 (discussing a dynamic model of 
innovation that requires multiple passes of investments and noting the ability to reach an “innovative leap” in 
“numerous steps that can be divided into smaller increments for purposes of investigation, [permitting] the 
costs of research [to] become unbundled”); id. at 387 (noting that government bears the risk of unsuccessful 
efforts and foreign misappropriation from subsidies, providing a basis for developing CRADAs to share these 
risks).  
 134 Cf. 41 U.S.C. §§ 405, 421(c)(1) (2006) (granting authority for the Federal Acquisition Regulations 
(FAR)); Frischmann, supra note 14, at 388 (noting that grants and procurement are distinguished principally 
by the functional relationship of the parties, the innovation outputs targeted⎯on the spectrum from basic to 
applied research⎯and whether the FAR are applicable). 
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2. Prizes, Rewards, and Other Ex Post Funding 
The next set of mechanisms includes prizes, rewards, and other ex post 
R&D or innovation funding. These mechanisms (that I will collectively call 
prizes) are typically conditioned on generating specific innovation outputs or 
quantities of them. Prizes may provide hortatory recognition,135 or financial 
incentives for R&D by promising ex ante, predetermined amounts, or ex ante 
uncertain but ex post innovation-generation-specified amounts.136 Some forms 
of government hortatory recognition (e.g., certifications), particularly when 
based on achieving particular output or quality levels for goods or services in 
markets, are treated under the market regulation category below. 
3. Consumption and Production Subsidies 
The next set of subsidy mechanisms is consumption or production 
subsidies, which include direct subsidies, feed-in tariffs,137 loan guarantees, 
 
 135 See, e.g., Patents for Humanity, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init_ 
events/patents_for_humanity.jsp (last modified Dec. 6, 2012) (creating an award competition providing public 
recognition and accelerated patent examination—a form of administrative subsidy⎯for using patented 
technology to advance “humanitarian challenges” in the fields of medical technology, food and nutrition, clean 
technology, and information technology). 
 136 See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 119–70 (2003) 
(discussing features of patent-prize systems, providing reasons why imperfect decision making should not be a 
bar to their adoption, and reviewing earlier proposals and their limitations); see also id. at 171–93 (discussing 
two additional roles of patents that prizes do not address—commercialization of inventions and screening of 
patent validity—and two additional problems with patents that prizes may address—common pool patent races 
and inventing around activity); Jonathan H. Adler, Eyes on a Climate Prize: Rewarding Energy Innovation to 
Achieve Climate Stabilization, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2011); Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent 
Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305 (1992); James Love & Tim Hubbard, Prizes for Innovation of 
New Medicines and Vaccines, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 155 (2009); Michael Polanvyi, Patent Reform, 11 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 61 (1944); cf. Gregory N. Mandel, When to Open Infrastructure Access, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 205, 
206–08 (2008) [hereinafter Mandel, When to Open Infrastructure] (discussing patent rewards⎯a form of prize 
where the government buys out an inventor’s patent rights and makes them available to the public⎯that can 
act like open-access policies that do not permit price discrimination among uses and users, without 
diminishing ex ante innovation incentives); Gregory N. Mandel, Promoting Environmental Innovation with 
Intellectual Property Innovation: A New Basis for Patent Rewards, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 51, 
64–67 (2005) (discussing benefits of rewards—including the reduction of deadweight losses, waste in 
inventing around patents, and licensing costs and thicket risks— noting existing methods of assessing social 
value of patents, and reciting four main criticisms of rewards: (1) failure to incentivize commercialization; (2) 
failure to provide incentives for fixed costs; (3) failure of opt-in systems to weed out bad patents; and (4) costs 
of administration). 
 137 See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Designing Effective Climate Policy: Cap-and-Trade and Complementary 
Policies, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207, 233 (2012) (discussing use of feed-in tariffs or production subsidies to 
address economies-of-scale market failures); David M. Driesen, Climate Disruption: An Economic Dynamic 
Approach, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,639, 10,645 (2012) (noting that feed-in tariffs sometimes require purchases at 
above-market prices); Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, Judge Cudahy and the Deference Tension in United States 
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and various kinds of credits. Consumption and production subsidies provide 
incentives to engage in R&D and innovation but normally are supplied 
conditionally and ex post to its outputs. The promise of these subsidies 
provides ex ante incentives to innovate, as well as to potentially fund further 
R&D within the same production firms (or allows consumers to redirect funds 
to R&D). However, because it is not tied directly to the R&D or innovation 
output (like direct subsidies or prizes), the potential of consumption or 
production subsidies to induce R&D and innovation is even more uncertain. 
4. Tax Subsidies 
Yet another set of subsidies is narrow or broad tax subsidies, which are 
distinguished from the direct transfer of funds to R&D, production, or 
consumption. Tax subsidies, like direct subsidies, may apply to basic and 
applied R&D expenditures, production, or consumption. Given that tax 
subsidies have value only in regard to taxable income, they are effective 
principally regarding commercial R&D and innovations.138 However, not-for-
profit R&D engaged in by tax-exempt entities reflects an implicit but 
untargeted tax subsidy to such innovation.  
Tax subsidies can be supplied as tax credits, expense deductions, cost 
allowances from taxable income, depreciation and amortization allowances, 
differential tax rates, refunds, or carryovers.139 They may apply to all 
expenditures or only to incremental ones above specified thresholds. They may 
also be used to attract foreign R&D and innovation investments by reducing 
relative costs of R&D in particular jurisdictions.140 Thus, tax subsidies may be 
 
Energy Law, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 371, 382 (2012) (discussing use of feed-in tariffs or required purchases to 
promote project development). See generally KARLYNN CORY ET AL., FEED-IN TARIFF POLICY: DESIGN, 
IMPLEMENTATION, AND RPS POLICY INTERACTIONS (2009).  
 138 See, e.g., Harhoff, supra note 41, at 57 (discussing different types of firms’ comparative benefits from 
tax expensing compared to carry-forwards of R&D and intangibles).  
 139 For a discussion on tax credits and deductions, see LAURA TYSON & GREG LINDEN, CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS, THE CORPORATE R&D TAX CREDIT AND U.S. INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVENESS: GAUGING THE 
ECONOMIC AND FISCAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CREDIT 21–22 (2012). 
 140 See id. at 22–24; see also 15 U.S.C. § 638 (2006) (Small Business Innovation Research Program); 26 
U.S.C. §§ 41, 174 (2006) (providing for the Research & Experimentation Tax Credit and the Research and 
Experimental Expenditures Deduction, respectively); Small Business Technology Transfer Program 
Reauthorization Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-50, 115 Stat. 263 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 638, 657 
(2006)); OECD, R&D TAX INCENTIVES: RATIONALE, DESIGN, EVALUATION 4–8 (2010), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/industryandglobalisation/46352862.pdf; TYSON & LINDEN, supra note 139, at 2 
(noting that the R&D tax credit is one of the largest federal tax expenditures, and that it has repeatedly lapsed 
and been restored retroactively); JACEK WARDA, OECD, R&D TAX TREATMENT IN OCED COUNTRIES: 
COMPARISONS AND EVALUATIONS (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/science/innovationinscience 
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tied more or less closely to the R&D activities or innovation outputs sought to 
be promoted, and therefore may vary regarding their stimulus to innovation. 
Further, they add uncertainty because potential recipients must assess ex ante 
the value of the perceived tax benefits for motivating R&D decisions.141 
Contrary to some earlier evidence suggesting that direct subsidies may 
substitute for corporate manufacturing-sector innovation funding whereas tax 
subsidies may induce greater expenditures,142 some recent evidence suggests 
that tax subsidies may be less effective than direct government subsidies for 
certain small- or medium-sized entities; tax subsidies may act as complements 
rather than as substitutes for inducing private R&D and innovation.143 
5. Administrative Subsidies 
There are also various forms of “administrative” subsidies, which can 
reduce the costs or increase the benefits obtained by private entities engaged in 
R&D or innovation in their interactions with the government. These cost 
reductions or benefit enhancements also act as an incentive to induce ex ante 
innovation, but may be more uncertain in regard to the conditions of their 
supply or the amount of benefit they provide. Exemplary administrative 
 
technologyandindustry/40024456.pdf; Praveen Goyal, The Future of the Canada–United States Relationship—
Innovation and Technology, Remarks at the Proceedings of the Canada–United States Law Institute 
Conference on An Example of Cooperation and Common Cause: Enhancing Canada–United States Security 
and Prosperity Through the Great Lakes and North American Trade (Apr. 2–4, 2009), in 34 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 
107, 115–16 (2010) (comparing foreign investment attractiveness of U.S. tax credits that are contingent on 
appropriations with Canadian tax credits against across-the-board taxes that are not contingent); cf. Preston 
Manning & Jack Mintz, Implications of the Recommendations of the Expert Panel on Federal Support to 
Research and Development 4 (Univ. of Calgary Sch. of Pub. Policy SPP Research Papers, Research Paper No. 
12-7, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2028124 (noting that Canada is 
second after Spain among large industrialized countries in federal and provincial tax support to innovation, but 
nevertheless has a “relatively low rate of business research and development activity”). See generally BD. ON 
SCI., TECH., & ECON. POLICY, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BORDERLINE CASE: INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY, 
CORPORATE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND INVESTMENT (James M. Poterba ed., 1997); Consuelo Lauda 
Kertz & James K. Hasson, Jr., University Research and Development Activities: The Federal Income Tax 
Consequences of Research Contracts, Research Subsidiaries and Joint Ventures, 13 J.C. & U.L. 109 (1986); 
Bronwyn H. Hall, Tax Incentives for Innovation in the United States: A Report to the European Union (Jan. 
15, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~bhhall/papers/BHH01%20EU%20 
Report%20USA%20rtax.pdf. 
 141 Cf. Frischmann, supra note 14, at 394–95 (noting that tax incentives are effective to the extent they are 
targeted at a cognizable class of innovations, and that “where the government has sufficient information or 
where cooperative arrangements can be structured . . . direct government funding may be [more] appropriate”). 
 142 See, e.g., Theofanis P. Mamuneas & M. Ishaq Nadiri, Public R&D Policies and Cost Behavior of the 
US Manufacturing Industries 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5059, 1995).  
 143 See, e.g., Isabel Busom et al., Tax Incentives or Subsidies for R&D? 4–5 (Maastricht Econ. & Soc. 
Research Inst. on Innovation & Tech., Working Paper No. 2012-056, 2012). 
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subsidies include reduced costs of applying for intellectual property rights and 
faster processing of applications for such rights.144 The reduced costs may thus 
be contingent on innovation outputs and either may not be perceived as a 
significant ex ante inducement or may not be cycled back into additional R&D 
efforts. The benefits of earlier protection may depend on uncertain or ex ante 
unperceived market conditions that will occur in the future. Such subsidies, 
moreover, may be provided in the form of extraordinary rewards to particular 
innovation outputs, and the amount of the administrative subsidy could readily 
exceed any realistic measure of its innovation-inducing potential. For example, 
serious consideration was given to providing “wild-card” extensions to 
unrelated patent terms for producing certain medical innovations.145 To the 
extent they provide rewards in excess of R&D and innovation costs, such 
subsidies look more like prizes. 
6. Foreign Aid 
Finally, foreign aid may be thought of as a subsidy to R&D and innovation. 
Foreign aid can include financing, expertise, and other assistance given 
directly or through intergovernmental organizations, provided either to the 
recipient jurisdiction’s government or its private sector. Foreign aid can target 
R&D directly or indirectly through subsidized consumption or production,146 
and may be given conditionally or unconditionally to achieve particular 
 
 144 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 41(h) (2006) (providing reduced patent prosecution fees for small business 
concerns); Estelle Derclaye, Not Only Innovation but Also Collaboration, Funding, Goodwill and 
Commitment: Which Role for Patent Laws in Post-Copenhagen Climate Change Action, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 657, 659, 670–71 (2010) (proposing for green patents accelerated examination, reduction, 
cancellation, or waiver of fees, removal of green inventions from deferred examination, earlier publication 
and/or priority at the opposition and infringement stages, and stronger protection, and also describing the 
Green Tech pilot program); Green Technology Pilot Program—CLOSED, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init_events/green_tech.jsp (last modified May 7, 2012). See generally ANTOINE 
DECHEZLEPRÊTRE, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., ISSUE PAPER NO. 37, FAST-TRACKING GREEN 
PATENT APPLICATIONS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (2013), available at http://ictsd.org/i/publications/154732/. 
 145 See, e.g., Jorn Sonderholm, Wild-Card Patent Extensions as a Means to Incentivize Research and 
Development of Antibiotics, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 240, 241 (2009) (discussing such proposals); B. Spellberg 
et al., Societal Costs Versus Savings from Wild-Card Patent Extension Legislation to Spur Critically Needed 
Antibiotic Development, 35 INFECTION 167 (2007) (modeling the costs and benefits and suggesting cost-
neutrality within ten years after marketing approval of the induced innovation); cf. Amy Kapczynski, 
Commentary, Innovation Policy for a New Era, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 264, 265–66 (2009) (criticizing such 
proposals for delinking the reward from the value of the innovation, eliminating flexibility in determining the 
reward, and hiding the true costs of the reward from the public). 
 146 See WORLD BANK, THE CLIMATE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM: ACCELERATING CLIMATE INNOVATION IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 3–4 (n.d.), available at http://www.infodev.org/en/Publication.1152.html.  
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innovation outputs or amounts.147 Of course, foreign aid to research may 
ultimately result in higher costs of purchasing research outputs by the 
providing governments or their citizens, cause shifts in international trade 
flows, and adversely affect comparative national economic advantages. For 
these reasons, it is rarely discussed in regard to national innovation policies, 
although analyses sometimes focus on the misappropriation of domestic 
government-funded research by foreign firms or governments, legitimately or 
through espionage.148 
7. General Considerations 
Direct and other subsidies to R&D may be a “useful substitute for stringent 
property rights designed to enhance R&D incentives and to reduce the extent 
of spillovers,” even if the need for a close relationship between upstream 
research and downstream development limits the value of such subsidies and 
suggests their use principally in areas where they will result in substantial 
positive spillovers.149 The fact that such subsidies can substitute for intellectual 
property rights also suggests that intellectual property rights are a form of ex 
post innovation subsidy (i.e., a government grant of wealth in the form of 
exclusive property rights)150 conditioned on achieving certain innovation 
outputs. The promise of the conditional subsidy generates ex ante incentives 
for such innovation. Granting a property rights subsidy to intermediate 
innovation outputs (patentable inventions rather than commercial products) 
may direct ex ante private investment toward more basic research by avoiding 
concerns about keeping research secret while internally recycling it to pursue 
further innovation.151 For present purposes, however, I have placed intellectual 
property rights in the market regulation category, as I believe they are better 
classified as a form of market intervention (through grants of exclusivity) and 
because of the importance of their relationship to market competition 
regulation after the grant of exclusive rights (subject to doctrines within 
 
 147 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 63, at 133 (distinguishing foreign aid “pull programs,” for which the 
public pays only if successful products are developed, from “push programs” that fund research). 
 148 See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 14, at 355. See generally Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-294, §101, 110 Stat. 3488, 3488–89 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831, 1832 (2006)) 
(addressing trade secrets). 
 149 Janusz A. Ordover, Economic Foundations and Considerations in Protecting Industrial and 
Intellectual Property, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 503, 509 (1984). 
 150 See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Authors’ Welfare: Copyright as a Statutory Mechanism for Redistributing 
Rights, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 229, 235–36 (2003).  
 151 See Frischmann, supra note 14, at 379 (noting returns to investment through licensing and the ability 
to draft patent claims to cover readily identified spillovers). 
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intellectual property law⎯such as preemption, misuse, and exhaustion⎯and 
outside such law—such as antitrust, price, product or process, consumer-
protection, and other regulatory laws). 
The choices that government can make among the various kinds of 
subsidies should depend on the degree to which the innovation outputs can be 
reliably predicted; the commercial nature of the research; and the comparative 
effectiveness of government administrators and firm actors in making 
predictions, directing the R&D, and generating innovation outputs.152 As 
noted, targeted R&D tax subsidies (and the ex ante incentives they generate) 
are useful principally for profit-making ventures, and they will leave control of 
innovation development to such firms, which is debatably better than having 
the government direct which innovations to target.153 But such simple insights 
do not get us very far because other forms of subsidies are available that could 
potentially induce more effective and efficient R&D and innovation 
development in the private sector. Such alternative subsidies include funds 
provided to universities and nonprofit research centers, or development 
through subsidizing private foundations. There simply are too many potentially 
effective alternative subsidy mechanisms to choose from.154 Further, as noted 
above, the preference for private control of development may not be 
adequately justified, in general or relative to particular government 
bureaucracies or public–private partnerships that exist or could be 
developed.155 The comparative R&D effectiveness of the relevant actors is 
unlikely to be known without detailed institutional analyses or experiments. In 
short, far too little is known to intelligently make very important decisions with 
far too much money. 
 
 152 See id. at 352–53; Henrik Vejen Kristensen et al., Adopting Eco-Innovation in Danish Polymer 
Industry Working with Nanotechnology: Drivers, Barriers and Future Strategies, 6 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & 
BUS. 416, 416, 433 (2009); see also Frischmann, supra note 14, at 392 (discussing choices depending on 
“subtle differences in the manner in which they target innovation market failures, rely on information 
processing, and have dynamic effects on incentives and other institutions”). 
 153 See Frischmann, supra note 14, at 352–53. 
 154 See, e.g., id. at 392–95 (comparing easier cases at the ends of the public–private-goods innovation 
spectrum for applied research with the greater complexity in between, and noting the increased difficulty of 
analyzing issues for more basic research). 
 155 See Tomain, supra note 53, at 404–16 (discussing the five Belfer principles—clearly defined mission, 
visionary and technically excellent leadership, entrepreneurial and competitive culture, structure and 
management system balancing independence and accountability, and stable and predictable funding⎯and two 
additional principles⎯“sell discipline,” or a focus on marketability, and planning and evaluation⎯and 
encouraging adoption of government energy-innovation agencies applying these principles); Radka, supra note 
101. 
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As has long been recognized, moreover, subsidies may distort research and 
other markets and over-reward innovation efforts.156 For example, direct 
subsidies may be provided to university professors who fail to produce quality 
research. Comparison to the developing understanding of intellectual property 
rights is helpful here. The creation of such rights to better assure the 
appropriability of R&D investments—or to avoid the loss of positive 
externalities by inducing disclosures rather than reliance on secrecy157—may 
result in raised prices, potentially wasteful duplication of research to obtain the 
property right, and the potential for excessive and strategically exploited 
market power.158 This is true even if decentralized, competitive research and 
attendant waste from duplication of efforts arguably performs better at 
technological development than centralized, controlled research that avoids 
such duplication.159 Direct R&D subsidies do not eliminate the potential for 
wasteful duplication of research efforts. But they also do not typically 
contribute to such duplication, absent intentional decisions to provide 
redundancy of research efforts to maximize the likelihood of achieving success 
from different research paths, or⎯as discussed infra in Part II.B⎯to avoid 
reliance on single sources of R&D expertise.160 
Unlike intellectual property grants, direct, prize, administrative, and foreign 
aid subsidies typically do not come with any necessary relationship to market 
regulation. However, such subsidies sometimes may be coupled with tax, 
production, or consumption subsidies, or with guaranteed procurements that 
 
 156 See, e.g., Matthew L. Wald, Solar Firm Aided by U.S. Shuts Doors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2011, at B1; 
Hans Biebl, Energy Subsidies, Market Distortion, and a Free Market Alternative, MICH. J. L. REFORM ONLINE 
(Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.mjlr.org/2012/10/energy-subsidies-market-distortion-and-a-free-market-
alternative/. 
 157 See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 14, at 372 n.91; Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? 
Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 107–08 (discussing patent and trade-secrecy 
tradeoffs in regard to “self-disclosing” and “non-self-disclosing” inventions).  
 158 See Ordover, supra note 149, at 507; cf. MACHLUP, supra note 23, at 7 (discussing simultaneous 
invention and noting the lack of social utility to the duplicative inventive outputs, characterizing the services of 
duplicative inventors as “free goods”). 
 159 See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 14, at 372–73 (noting that duplication may be wasteful only for 
applied research having known, narrow applications); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex 
Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 842–43 (1990) (discussing Edmund W. Kitch, The 
Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977), providing reasons why competition 
may be more successful, and tracing historical examples); cf. John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of 
Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 442–44 (2004) (discussing innovation races and rent dissipation by three 
mechanisms⎯accelerated research expenditures, duplicative efforts, and reduced time for commercialization 
under monopoly conditions⎯under which competition is channeled to earlier placement of innovation in the 
public domain to maximize social welfare). 
 160 See infra notes 173–93 and accompanying text. 
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can dramatically alter market dynamics.161 Conversely, intellectual property 
rights may be granted through auctions rather than through temporal races, 
which can reduce the implicit subsidies and wealth transfers that the exclusive 
rights supply. Depending on the auction’s contract-like conditions, such grants 
can reduce the deadweight losses of patent races, monopoly pricing, and 
failures to develop or license within the prospect and market.162 Arguably, 
direct and prize subsidies already are or could be awarded through auctions of 
various types, which would reduce the social costs of awarding them. For 
example, applications for direct subsidies are already assessed to determine 
which grantee is most likely to generate the desired innovation outcomes, 
thereby providing bidding competition based on perceived competence rather 
than the amount of the subsidy to be awarded.163 Both direct subsidies and 
prizes could be awarded to competitors that offer to achieve the desired 
innovation output for the lowest reward, with the distinction being whether the 
amount is actually conditioned on achieving success. What should be obvious 
from this discussion is that choosing the right actor to direct money (or other 
embellishments) and the right amount of the subsidy to achieve any particular 
innovation output in the most efficient way may require both information that 
is not currently available and institutional competencies that do not currently 
exist. In many cases the innovation output desired is itself uncertain. 
Subsidies provide financing and various other embellishments that can 
reduce political, currency, regulatory, execution, technology, and unfamiliarity 
risks that exist regarding technology dissemination efforts, and thereby induce 
 
 161 Cf. Brennan et al., supra note 75, at 6–18 (comparing prizes, patents, contracts, grants, and standard 
procurement; noting similar problems of analysis and distributional effects regarding tax policy choices; and 
describing idiosyncratic benefits of relying on prizes). 
 162 See, e.g., WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT 
OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1969); Michael Abramowicz, The Uneasy Case for Patent Races over Auctions, 
60 STAN. L. REV. 803, 804–25 (2007) (citing, inter alia, Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ 
Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-
Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985 (1999)); Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. 
ECON. & STAT. 348 (1968); R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959); 
Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55, 63 (1968); see also Michael Abramowicz, The 
Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1065 (2007) (suggesting a system of 
patent-extension auctions under which a patentee would be allowed to request such an auction, but could only 
win it by substantially outbidding third parties); cf. Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement 
Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1593–98 (2011) (noting that a standard where the patent will 
not issue if the invention would have been created anyway avoids deadweight losses, but arguing for a more 
limited inducement standard based on delayed deadweight losses). 
 163 See, e.g., Peer Review Process, NAT’L INST. HEALTH, http://grants.nih.gov/grants/peer_review_ 
process.htm#scoring (last updated Mar. 4, 2013) (discussing review criteria for grants and cooperative 
agreements, which include scientific merit, significance, and investigator suitability). 
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investment in R&D, innovation, and technology development.164 Further, when 
subsidies are specifically tied to developing particular technologies or fields,165 
they may raise substantial trade concerns over market distortion, preferential 
treatment, and national efforts to promote comparative advantage.166 As 
discussed infra in Part II.E,167 however, R&D markets and subsidies are 
thought to be different from production markets and subsidies. R&D 
innovation subsidies—whether direct, prize based, or tax based—have been 
treated differently from production and consumption subsidies in light of the 
broad recognition of their public-goods character. For example, R&D subsidies 
(structured in a particular manner) were for a time considered nonactionable 
under the WTO’s subsidies and countervailing duties code.168 Whether and 
when such differential treatment is justified or tolerated may ultimately be a 
political question regarding how much R&D to promote. But the issue will 
likely remain controversial, and trade concerns will likely create pressures to 
direct the choices of innovation funds away from production and consumption 
subsidies or from R&D subsidies for particular technologies or fields. 
 
 164 See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE WORKING GRP. III, METHODOLOGICAL 
AND TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 5–6 (2000), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/ 
special-reports/spm/srtt-en.pdf; SUNIL MANI, GOVERNMENT, INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY: AN 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 29–35 (2002) (explaining the relationship between financial 
measures such as tax incentives and venture capital with the promotion of innovation in developed countries, 
finding that tax incentives are “the most important and widely used instrument” of fiscal incentives for 
promoting innovation and R&D); WORLD BANK, supra note 4, at 292–94, 303, 311; see also Frischmann, 
supra note 14, at 363 (discussing production and appropriation risks). 
 165 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–5, §§ 1101, 1141, 123 Stat. 
115, 319, 326–28 (extending tax credits for renewable energy production, furnishing substantial public funds 
for transportation and energy infrastructure, and providing a range of direct and production and consumption 
subsidies for various energy-efficiency and renewable-energy technologies); cf. American Clean Energy and 
Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §§ 111–16, 123–25, 171, 724, 782 (2009). This proposal was 
known as the Waxman–Markey bill, and would have established an emissions trading scheme and provided 
substantial subsidies for clean energy technologies, carbon capture and sequestration, electric and other 
advanced technology vehicles, and basic R&D. 
 166 See, e.g., INT’L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FACT SHEET: COMMERCE PRELIMINARILY 
FINDS DUMPING OF CRYSTALLINE SILICON PHOTOVOLTAIC CELLS, WHETHER OR NOT ASSEMBLED INTO 
MODULES FROM THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2012), available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/ 
factsheets/factsheet-prc-solar-cells-adcvd-prelim-20120320.pdf (noting preliminary determination of dumping 
of various Chinese solar cells); Matthew Dalton & Jan Hromadko, EU to Investigate Chinese Solar-Panel 
Makers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2012, at B3 (noting investigations in the European Union on Chinese solar 
panels based on allegations of illegal subsidies from below-market export pricing, which was financed by 
state-owned, bank-provided low-cost loans, and discussing China’s efforts to promote its solar photovoltaic 
sector). 
 167 See infra notes 280–84 and accompanying text. 
 168 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM Agreement]. 
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Finally, returning to comparative innovation-inducing effectiveness, direct 
subsidies for particular innovation outputs will likely be more effective than 
indirect ones (such as generalized R&D tax subsidies) where there are market 
failures or other externalities that make commercialization of a technology 
unlikely.169 Examples that illustrate this include the development of new 
medicines to address neglected diseases for which expected returns are 
insufficient to fund clinical trials or pollution controls when the health and 
environmental harms can continue to be externalized.170 Recent studies suggest 
that subsidies may be less effective than market regulation (particularly 
regarding the internalization of externalities) in promoting innovation, that 
both combined are more effective than either separately, and that subsidies 
may, in some circumstances, be more effective and efficient in inducing 
innovation than taxing externalities.171 
Again, this does not get us very far. Having canvassed subsidies relatively 
thoroughly, I address below the other forms of innovation funding choice 
(except market regulation) somewhat more cursorily, referring back to 
considerations that have now been elaborated. 
B. Procurement 
As noted above, procurement resembles R&D and innovation subsidies, but 
it typically provides incentives by conditioning funding on achieving 
innovation outputs that are commercial or noncommercial products.172 
Through 1993 in the United States, R&D procurement contracts composed the 
largest amount of federal public-sector support for R&D, followed by 
subsidies, which took the form of tax incentives more than direct grants.173 
This may seem surprising but is partially explained by the dramatic growth of 
military expenditures as a proportion of the overall budget and by the general 
decline of R&D expenditures since its peak during the Cold War space race in 
 
 169 See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 14, at 382–83, 394–98. 
 170 See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach 
for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1053 (2005); Popp et al., supra note 37, at 2–3, 48–
49; cf. Sean Flynn et al., An Economic Justification for Open Access to Essential Medicine Patents in 
Developing Countries, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 184, 188–92 (2009) (discussing failures to price discriminate in 
providing medicines to countries with highly stratified incomes). 
 171 See, e.g., Popp et al., supra note 37, at 4–5; see also id. at 5 (citing Rob Hart, The Timing of Taxes on 
CO2 Emissions when Technological Change Is Endogenous, 55 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 194 (2008)) (noting 
that targeted R&D subsidies may induce more rapid technological development at lower costs than increased 
early taxation above externality-internalizing levels). 
 172 See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 173 See MANI, supra note 164, at 10, 31 fig.1.11, 32 tbl.1.8. 
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the 1960s.174 A significant portion of current defense R&D costs can be 
attributed to the development and procurement of very high-technology 
weapons systems,175 although other governmental expenditures (within and 
outside the defense sector) of purchased outputs also may have led to induced 
R&D and innovation. 
There are many possible forms of procurement that allocate risk differently 
between the parties to the procurement contract. These include fixed price with 
sealed bidding or negotiated prices, with the producer bearing most of the cost 
and profit risks; negotiated cost reimbursement, with the government bearing 
most of the risks; and all sorts of intermediate types.176 Of course, the 
government bears the risk that the contractor will not produce as desired, and 
the contractor bears the risk that the government will not appropriate sufficient 
funds to fulfill the contract—which is subject to the Anti-Deficiency Act.177 
Similarly, procurement of innovation can be distinguished among the 
following: direct procurement for the government as the only consumer of 
goods and services (e.g., bomber aircraft) or as a catalyst for the market (e.g., 
software); procurement at commercial or precommercial stages; general 
procurement of innovation outputs; strategic procurement of outputs intended 
to stimulate the market; cooperative procurement with both public and private 
sectors as buyers and users; or exclusively catalytic procurement where private 
entities ultimately are the sole exclusive users of the innovative outputs.178 
 
 174 See, e.g., Robert Pollin & Heidi Garrett-Peltier, Benefits of a Slimmer Pentagon, NATION, May 28, 
2012, at 15 (describing how military spending in 2011 reflected 4.7% of gross domestic product, while in 2000 
it reflected 3%); Policy Basics: Where Do Our Federal Tax Dollars Go?, CENTER ON BUDGET & POL’Y 
PRIORITIES, http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1258 (last updated Aug. 13, 2012) (discussing 
the 2011 budget, which allocated 20% to defense and international security, 3% to transportation and 
infrastructure, 2% to education, and 2% to science and medical research); R&D Spending by the Federal 
Government, DEPARTMENT NUMBERS (Jan. 2, 2012), http://www.deptofnumbers.com/blog/2012/01/rd-
spending-by-federal-gov. See generally ELISA EISEMAN ET AL., RAND SCI. & TECH. POLICY INST., FEDERAL 
INVESTMENT IN R&D (2002), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR1639.0.pdf 
(reviewing the federal government’s R&D portfolio and recommending areas where programs should be 
expanded, curtailed, or maintained); Mark Boroush et al., Research and Development: National Trends and 
International Comparisons, in SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2012, at 4-1 (2012), available at 
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind12/pdf/seind12.pdf (focusing on R&D and presenting data on public and 
private performance in the United States, as well as examining related international investments or transactions 
involving R&D financing or performance). 
 175 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE UNDER SEC’Y OF DEF. (COMPTROLLER)/CFO, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., FISCAL 
YEAR 2012 BUDGET REQUEST: PROGRAM ACQUISITION COSTS BY WEAPON SYSTEM, at table of contents 
(2011), available at http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2012/FY2012_Weapons.pdf. 
 176 See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. pt. 16 (2012). 
 177 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006). 
 178 See, e.g., Jakob Edler & Luke Georghiou, Public Procurement and Innovation—Resurrecting the 
Demand Side, 36 RES. POL’Y 949, 953–54 (2007). 
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Although there is no theoretically necessary relationship between 
government procurement and the creation of intellectual property rights, the 
Bayh–Dole Act applies to government procurement contracts “for the 
performance of experimental, developmental, or research work funded in 
whole or in part by the Federal Government.”179 Additionally, a complex set of 
federal agency regulations and policies exists regarding the creation, 
ownership, or use of intellectual property rights or rights in data developed 
through a broader range of government contracts, including those not primarily 
intended to promote R&D or innovation.180 However, contractors working “by 
or for” the government are free to “use or manufacture” the patents or 
copyrights of third parties without a license if they are within the scope of the 
procurement contract, and the government is subject to liability to the rights 
holder for “reasonable and entire compensation” through a statutory takings 
claim.181 
The effects of procurement on innovation depend partly on whether the 
contracts take the form of “push” or “pull” mechanisms with regard to existing 
or future markets. Push mechanisms (ex ante market procurement) provide a 
demonstration of technology and a stimulus to market development so that 
industry may subsequently be more willing to risk market entry.182 Push 
mechanisms also raise questions as to the size of the government sector and its 
adequacy to demonstrate commercial viability in a broader market without 
government subsidies to production or consumption. Regulation of market 
prices for innovation outputs (or rate-based returns to regulated industries, as 
in the electric utility sector) further complicates the evaluation of the 
inducement effectiveness and adequacy of innovation returns to procurement 
funding.183 
Pull mechanisms (ex post market procurement) provide ex ante innovation 
incentives based on ex post assurances (to innovation creation) of the adequacy 
 
 179 35 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006). 
 180 See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. pts. 27, 227 (2012).  
 181 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2006); see also Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1309, 1326–27 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that government liability under § 1498 is not limited to patent infringement liability 
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), but that it also applies to § 271(g)). 
 182 See, e.g., RUTTAN, supra note 26, at 108–09 (discussing government procurement of software).  
 183 See, e.g., Joskow & Rose, supra note 105, at 1464–77 (discussing studies of the effects on prices in 
various regulated and deregulated industries); C. O. Ruggles, Problems of Public-Utility Rate Regulation and 
Fair Return, 32 J. POL. ECON. 543, 543–58 (1924) (discussing lack of clear definitions, changes in conditions, 
duplication concerns, character of service, and efficiency of management); cf. Duffy, supra note 159, at 444–
45 (citing Demsetz, supra note 162) (comparing patent-prospect management and auction pricing to that of 
natural monopolies). 
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of scale for commercialization, which again reduces market entry risks. These 
ex post assurances of procurement (advanced purchase commitment contracts) 
are, effectively, ex post consumption subsidies where the government acts as a 
consumer on behalf of the public. However, the price terms of these ex post 
innovation contracts may be highly uncertain and subject to statutory and 
“march-in” rights regarding patented innovation outputs and other 
contractually retained rights. Often, as with public–private partnerships, the 
scope of the market purchase guarantees, conditions on market behavior and 
pricing terms, and treatment of developed intellectual property and retained 
ownership rights are negotiated in advance.184 
Bidding also affects the amount of funding that is directed at innovation 
through procurement mechanisms. Bidding for procurement thus resembles 
auctioning for prizes, with the potential awardees competing ex ante to lower 
the funding levels they hope to obtain and for which they are willing to work 
for a defined innovation output. However, the ex ante contract award 
(particularly with progress payments) is perhaps less conditioned on achieving 
the output than an ex post prize award.185 This brings to mind the old adage, 
“you get what you pay for.” In contrast, bidding competition regarding non-
price terms resembles direct subsidy grant review, where the amount of 
funding is fixed but the choice of “contractor” best situated to achieve the 
predetermined innovation outputs are determined based on other factors.186 
As with subsidies,187 government procurement of R&D or innovation may 
sometimes crowd out private R&D funding. Procurement thus may be 
particularly appropriate for costly private good production where there is no 
market or where the recovery of costs is uncertain, and where firms will not 
otherwise expend funds on R&D or innovation.188 Accordingly, procurement 
drives much military R&D and also some medical R&D through guaranteed 
purchase contracts for medicines for developing-country markets.189 
 
 184 See, e.g., Ron A. Bouchard, Qualifying Intellectual Property II: A New Innovation Index for 
Pharmaceutical Patents & Products, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 287, 382 (2011–2012). 
 185 See supra notes 133–37 and accompanying text. 
 186 See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text. Further, the outputs of bidding may often be much 
less specific than in contracting. 
 187 See, e.g., Scott J. Wallsten, The Effects of Government-Industry R&D Programs on Private R&D: The 
Case of the Small Business Innovation Research Program, 31 RAND J. ECON. 82, 82–83 (2000). 
 188 See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 14, at 373–74 & n.100, 390, 391 n.192. 
 189 See, e.g., supra note 26; see also U.S. PRESIDENT’S EMERGENCY PLAN FOR AIDS RELIEF, USING 
SCIENCE TO SAVE LIVES: LATEST PEPFAR FUNDING (2012), available at http://www.pepfar.gov/documents/ 
organization/189671.pdf (documenting funding since 2004). 
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Procurement also may be duplicative and thus potentially wasteful of R&D 
funding inputs. Multiple sourcing of procured technology, however, can lead to 
broader and quicker diffusion of knowledge and to an increased pace of 
innovation.190 Sole sourcing, moreover, is discouraged by the FAR to avoid 
concerns about monopoly pricing.191 
Finally, procurement may raise serious trade concerns, particularly if 
procurement favors domestic industries and thereby imposes non-neutral 
innovation risk reductions. For example, China has recently engaged in 
substantial domestic procurement preferences and administrative subsidies to 
promote “national champion” industries that can develop export markets, 
which force creation of joint ventures that transfer innovative technologies “in 
exchange for being granted the ability to invest in China.”192 Given that R&D 
subsidies may be treated differently,193 the trade concerns may be more or less 
severe when the procurement is directed at particular R&D outputs or at 
general market activities that require R&D inputs. 
C. Direct Development 
The government engages in all sorts of R&D and innovation funded 
through general or specific taxes and other sources of government revenue. 
This reflects that government employees are user-innovators,194 that 
government agencies engage in R&D to generate different kinds of innovation 
outputs in the course of conducting their statutory mandates, and that 
 
 190 See, e.g., RUTTAN, supra note 26, at 101 (discussing the military procurement policy of “second 
sourcing” to avoid dependence on single suppliers and its effects on diffusion of knowledge and entry of new 
firms).  
 191 See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. §§ 6.300–.305 (2012) (establishing requirements for when contracting can occur 
other than through full and open competition). 
 192 ROBERT D. ATKINSON, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., ENOUGH IS ENOUGH: CONFRONTING 
CHINESE INNOVATION MERCANTILISM 33 (2012), available at http://www.itif.org/publications/enough-enough-
confronting-chinese-innovation-mercantilism; see, e.g., Siyuan An & Brian Peck, China’s Indigenous 
Innovation Policy in the Context of Its WTO Obligations and Commitments, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 375, 417–23, 
434–42 (2011) (discussing whether, if the purchasing by Chinese government agencies requires import 
substitution for accredited indigenous innovation products, it qualifies as a subsidy under Article 1 and is 
prohibited by Article 3 of the SCM Agreement, on a de jure—mandated—or de facto—in practice—basis; also 
analyzing potential claims for lack of national treatment regarding maintenance and use rights of intellectual 
property and discrimination against patents by field of technology under Articles 3 and 27.1 of the TRIPS 
agreement); Boumil, supra note 81, at 775–77 (discussing exceptions in annexes to the GPA and to the 
national treatment in procurement obligation of Art. III—including for R&D activities—and noting potential 
violations if China were to accede to the GPA). 
 193 See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 194 See supra notes 39, 40 and accompanying text. 
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government sometimes creates specialized bureaucracies to perform R&D and 
generate innovation in particular sectors. The most well-known of these 
specialized R&D bureaucracies are the national laboratories (including 
weapons laboratories) operated by various government departments, but there 
are other government institutions primarily focused on R&D, such as the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).195 Some national 
laboratories receive large amounts of funding for their particular fields, which 
may be greater or less than corresponding subsidies or procurement funds 
directed to private entities in those fields. For one example, the National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) of the Department of Energy—
originally, the Solar Energy Research Institute—received $110 million in 
innovation research funding under the 2009 American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act.196 
As noted earlier, government policy permits cooperative R&D agreements 
(CRADAs) with private entities.197 This permits greater leveraging of federal 
funding for particular forms of innovation conducted within the government. 
Further, private entities may manage government research bureaucracies, such 
as the NREL, blurring the line between the public and private sectors.198 
Additionally, government can collaborate among its own agencies,199 with 
subsidiary or foreign governments, or with intergovernmental organizations 
through interpersonnel agreements (IPA)200 and other collaborative efforts and 
 
 195 Cf. Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, § 12(d)(2), 100 Stat. 1785, 1787 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 3710a (2006)) (“[T]he term ‘laboratory’ means a facility or group of 
facilities owned, leased, or otherwise used by a Federal agency, a substantial purpose of which is the 
performance of research, development, or engineering by employees of the Federal Government.”).  
 196 See RIMMER, supra note 97, at 287. 
 197 See Federal Technology Transfer Act § 12(d)(1) (“[T]he term ‘cooperative research and development 
agreement’ means any agreement between one or more Federal laboratories and one or more non-Federal 
parties under which the Government, through its laboratories, provides personnel, services, facilities, 
equipment, or other resources with or without reimbursement (but not funds to non-Federal parties) and the 
non-Federal parties provide funds, personnel, services, facilities, equipment, or other resources toward the 
conduct of specified research or development efforts which are consistent with the missions of the laboratory; 
except that such term does not include a procurement contract or cooperative agreement . . . .”); supra note 133 
and accompanying text (discussing CRADAs); see also RIMMER, supra note 97, at 276–77 (noting government 
institutional development alone or in joint partnerships with the private sector). 
 198 See, e.g., National Renewable Energy Laboratory, BATTELLE, http://www.battelle.org/our-
work/laboratory-management/national-renewable-energy-laboratory (last visited May 12, 2013). NREL is 
managed by the Alliance for Sustainable Energy, LLC. 
 199 See, e.g., OMB 2013 BUDGET REPORT, supra note 56, at 369. 
 200 See, e.g., Intergovernmental Personnel Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-648, 84 Stat. 1909 (1971) (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4701 et seq. (2006)). 
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personnel exchanges.201 Government also can engage in collaborative R&D, 
thereby pooling funds, technology, and other resources like in joint-
venturing.202 
Government direct development thus may lead to the generation of 
government-owned intellectual property rights. For example, NREL possesses 
a significant portfolio of patents on wind turbines, generators, power systems, 
cooling towers, biofuels, and geothermal technologies and building 
construction. NREL has also developed an online database—the Energy 
Efficiency and Renewable Energy Technology Portal—to license its rights.203 
Depending on how they are exercised, these government-owned intellectual 
property rights may have further effects on domestic and foreign markets and 
trade flows.204 Whether and how the government chooses to license its 
intellectual property rights for further R&D or innovation then becomes an 
important issue, as the government may choose to compete with the private 
sector in the market (although it rarely does). Even if the government does not 
directly compete with the private sector and supplies only to the government 
sector, government development and supply can lead to price reductions in the 
commercial market through competitive development, as well as to private 
market shares that would be smaller than if the government sector were 
included and in which private entities could better recoup their innovation 
investments. 
International collaborations similarly raise questions about the joint 
management of intellectual property that may be required or developed. For 
example, in regard to collaborations to develop technology and intellectual 
property through shared investment in research, former Secretary of Energy 
Steven Chu noted: 
 
 201 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance Cooperation 
on Climate Change, Energy and Environment Between the Government of the United States of America and 
the Government of the People’s Republic of China (July 28, 2009), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ 
ps/2009/july/126592.htm; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Memorandum of Understanding Signed Between 
the Government of India and the Government of the United States (Nov. 30, 2009), available at 
http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/press/2009/132776.htm (dealing with enhanced cooperation regarding energy 
security, energy efficiency, clean energy, and climate change). See generally BUSH, supra note 16, at 107–08 
(discussing scientific congresses, international fellowships, and scientific attachés). 
 202 See, e.g., supra notes 133, 201 and accompanying text. 
 203 RIMMER, supra note 97, at 290–91 (noting NREL patent portfolios in other technology areas). 
 204 Id. at 266 (noting comments regarding the joint ownership of intellectual property emerging from the 
US–China Clean Energy Center that “‘the plan is for the two governments to get royalty-free access to the 
intellectual property that comes out of the center; private companies could buy in at low rates’” (quoting 
Daniel Roth, The Radical Pragmatist, WIRED, May 2010, at 104, 108) (citation omitted)). 
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These joint efforts will allow several nations to share the costs and 
benefits of intellectual property they jointly fund, helping avoid 
disputes over intellectual property rights and speeding the world’s 
transition to a clean energy economy. 
 . . . Sharing of IPR . . . should be done where the sharing is 
mutually beneficial . . . . for example . . . by an exchange of non-
proprietary information, royalty free or royalty bearing cross 
licensing, a patent pool . . . open source software distribution . . . . 
[and] may very well inure to the commercial benefit of the supplying 
entity by opening new markets.205 
Like its contractors in procurement, the government cannot be enjoined from 
using intellectual property that it needs because it has waived sovereign 
immunity only for suits for reasonable compensation.206 Given their inherent 
powers, government agencies may be more able than private entities to seek to 
compel transfers of know-how to support their R&D and innovation-producing 
activities.207 
Finally, depending on their internal cultures and public mores, government 
agencies may be more or less able to attract needed R&D and innovation-
producing expertise.208 Government employment may currently be viewed as 
less attractive than jobs in the private commercial and nonprofit sectors, and 
government employees may currently be subject to greater public 
 
 205 Id. at 264–65 (quoting Letter from Steven Chu, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, to F. James 
Sensenbrenner, Jr., Ranking Republican Member, U.S. House of Representatives Select Comm. on Energy 
Independence & Global Warming (May 5, 2009)). 
 206 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2006); Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331, 
341–44 (1928); supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 207 See, e.g., FREDERICK M. ABBOTT, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV., ISSUE PAPER NO. 
12, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROVISIONS OF BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS IN LIGHT OF 
U.S. FEDERAL LAW 11–12 (2006), available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteipc20064_en.pdf (discussing the 
inherent power of the government to compel such action by law and the U.S. Government’s implied threat to 
compel production of ciprofloxacin in response to an anthrax scare). See generally Elizabeth A. Rowe, Striking 
a Balance: When Should Trade-Secret Law Shield Disclosures to the Government?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 791 
(2011) (discussing how courts should approach “refusal-to-submit” cases, where companies refuse to submit 
information requested by the government). 
 208 See BUSH, supra note 16, at 95–98 (discussing criteria for selecting civil servants to promote R&D and 
recommending various forms of R&D cooperation across government agencies); U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., 
ATTRACTING THE NEXT GENERATION: A LOOK AT FEDERAL ENTRY-LEVEL NEW HIRES (2008), available at 
http://www.mspb.gov/netsearch/viewdocs.aspx?docnumber=314895&version=315306&application= 
ACROBAT (exploring how the federal government attracts and hires new employees, especially in regard to 
R&D). 
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opprobrium,209 but this is not a necessary state of affairs. Direct development 
by the government should not be routinely dismissed as an innovation funding 
choice, although creating new bureaucracies may be politically difficult in the 
current climate. As noted by then-Secretary of Energy Chu, “I took the 
challenge of being Secretary of Energy in part for the chance to ensure that the 
[DOE] Laboratories and our country’s universities will generate ideas that will 
help us address our energy challenges. . . . DOE must strive to be the modern 
version of the old Bell Labs in energy research.”210 
This merely reinforces the need for additional study of the relative 
efficiency and effectiveness of direct development compared to private-sector 
funding options regarding the creation of large- or small-scale innovation 
outputs. In addition to the factors noted above, more specific analysis is needed 
in regard to the comparative expertise in identifying and directing development 
of scientific and technological research, and the comparative ability to develop, 
commercialize, market, and license the various kinds of innovation outputs.211 
D. Constructed Commons 
Yet another form of government innovation funding relates to the creation 
of various kinds of commons for managing physical or information resources 
to induce innovation.212 The most obvious form of commons is government-
 
 209 See, e.g., U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., supra note 208, at 31 (“[C]ollege graduates and public policy 
graduate students tend to view entry-level Government jobs as less challenging, rewarding and professionally 
beneficial than private and nonprofit sector jobs. They tend to believe that the private sector offers better 
compensation, more challenging work and better developmental opportunities, while the nonprofit sector 
offers more rewarding work.”); Charles Babington, Mitt Romney’s Public, Private Jobs Claims Contradict, 
HUFFINGTON POST (June 14, 2012, 2:39 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/14/mitt-romney-jobs-
public-private_n_1596034.html (quoting former presidential candidate Mitt Romney as saying, “[w]e have 
145,000 more government workers under this president. Let’s send them home and put you back to work”). 
 210 RIMMER, supra note 97, at 261 (alteration in original) (quoting New Directions for Energy Research 
and Development at the U.S. Department of Energy: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Sci. & Tech., 111th 
Cong. 17 (2009) (statement of Steven Chu, Secretary of Energy)). 
 211 To some extent, these considerations recapitulate the Bayh–Dole Act discussion above. See supra 
notes 64–76 and accompanying text. 
 212 See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, Copyright, Fair Use, and Creative Commons Licenses, in RISK AND 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN LIBRARIES: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHANGE 18 (Pamela Bluh & Cindy Hepfer 
eds., 2009); Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, supra note 82, at 681–82; see also Terry L. Anderson & 
Gary D. Libecap, Forging a New Environmental and Resource Economics Paradigm: The Contractual Bases 
for Exchange, in PERSPECTIVES ON COMMERCIALIZING INNOVATION 117, 117–28 (F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. 
Paredes eds., 2012) (discussing the evolutionary nature of property rights and their creation by government, 
which facilitates bargaining regarding relevant resources). See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE 
COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy 
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created or government-subsidized physical infrastructure, such as the highway 
system or the Internet.213 But commons in information also may be 
constructed, subsidized, or regulated by government. For example, the World 
Meteorological Organization—a United Nations specialized agency—and 
others sponsor and make available data on polar climate conditions that are 
generated and submitted by governments and private sector scientists.214 
Another example, the Conservation Commons, is a cooperative effort of 
intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, 
governments, academic institutions, and entities from the private sector; the 
Conservation Commons supports open access to data and sharing (with 
attribution) of information and knowledge for mutual benefit regarding 
biodiversity.215 The U.S. government’s Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) 
signals are freely available from the military and NASA, following an 
international incident after which NASA concluded that the public benefits of 
new, nonmilitary and nonaviation uses of the data justified continuing to 
provide it free of cost.216 Government also may manage commons that are 
created with private data, such as the U.S. National Library of Medicine’s 
PubMed Central, and submission to such a commons may either be encouraged 
or required by government agency policies.217 
 
of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, 
and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986). 
 213 See, e.g., FRISCHMANN, supra note 23, at 5–6 (discussing various features that help to define 
infrastructure); Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 
MINN. L. REV. 917, 923–24, 956 (2005) (noting “traditional” infrastructure of transportation, communication, 
and governance systems, as well as basic public services and facilities like schools and sewers; defining 
infrastructure from the demand-side by reference to non-rivalrous inputs for which social demand is driven by 
their use as inputs to downstream productive activity and that are used to produce widespread outputs); 
Mandel, When to Open Infrastructure, supra note 136, at 208–10 (discussing three stages of infrastructure for 
which open access may differentially reduce ex ante innovation incentives: (1) not yet conceived; (2) 
conceived but not yet developed; and (3) developed and need to be managed); Konstantinos K. Stylianou, An 
Innovation-Centric Approach of Telecommunications Infrastructure Regulation, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 221, 
231–40 (2011) (discussing interactions of innovation, market forces, and regulation in telecommunications). 
 214 See, e.g., Welcome to the Polar Information Commons (PIC), POLAR INFO. COMMONS, 
http://www.polarcommons.org/ (last visited May 12, 2013). 
 215 See, e.g., Conservation Commons, CONSERVEONLINE, http://conserveonline.org/workspaces/commons/ 
(last visited May 12, 2013). 
 216 See, e.g., James Love & Tim Hubbard, Paying for Public Goods, in CODE: COLLABORATIVE 
OWNERSHIP AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 207, 208–09 (Rishab Aiyer Ghosh ed., 2005). 
 217 See, e.g., Revised Policy on Enhancing Public Access to Archived Publications Resulting from NIH-
Funded Research, NAT’L INST. HEALTH, http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/not-od-08-033.html 
(last visited May 12, 2013); see also Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–8, § 217, 123 Stat. 
524, 782 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 282c (2006)). 
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In addition to formal commons, informal commons of government-
sponsored information and other outputs also exist. For example, many forms 
of government records qualify as public-sector information that may be made 
available for free or at noncommercial prices for further private, commercial 
and nonprofit use.218 
Government may subsidize and regulate private-sector-commons 
institutions regarding prices of inputs and outputs, access, and other terms of 
interaction, without limiting the application of competition law and policy.219 
Similar to government direct development, government-commons approaches 
may supplement or compete with the private sector in regard to innovation 
promotion. For example, governments may affect commons-based activities by 
requiring or encouraging the pooling of technology or intellectual property 
rights;220 providing or supporting free or low-cost access to information 
outputs that are R&D or innovation inputs;221 and engaging in or encouraging 
interpersonnel exchanges.222 If technology- or patent-pooling occurs, 
significant competition regulation issues will arise. For example, in the area of 
patent-pools, questions arise regarding whether patents in the pool are essential 
or nonessential, and concerns are raised over the preclusion of alternative 
technologies, which concerns supplement more routine competition concerns 
 
 218 See, e.g., Council Directive 2003/98, On the Re-Use of Public Sector Information, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 
90 (EC). 
 219 See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill, Network Neutrality and the False Promise of Zero-Price Regulation, 25 
YALE J. ON REG. 135, 164–75 (2008) (discussing private pricing and access contractual options and private 
subsidies that others seek to establish through government-mandated, zero-price approaches); Michael J. 
Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, The University as Constructed Cultural Commons, 
30 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 365, 375–76 (2009) (noting, inter alia, subsidies, safe harbors, privileges, or 
exemptions from antitrust liability used to facilitate or create commons). See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, 
CODE: VERSION 2.0 (2006) (discussing how hardware and software as well as law regulates the Internet 
commons). 
 220 For a good discussion of the classic example of the government’s threat to nationalize production in 
the aircraft sector, which led to creation of a privately managed patent pool—the Manufactured Aircraft 
Association—and subsequent commons-based developments, see Dustin R. Szakalski, Progress in the Aircraft 
Industry and the Role of Patent Pools and Cross-Licensing Agreements, 15 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1 (2011); 
Harry T. Dykman, Patent Licensing Within the Manufacturer’s Aircraft Association (MAA), 46 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC’Y 646 (1964); and Merges & Nelson, supra note 159, at 888–90. 
 221 See, e.g., Human Genome Project Information, U.S. DEPARTMENT ENERGY OFF. SCI., 
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/home.shtml (last modified July 31, 2012); INT’L 
HAPMAP PROJECT, http://hapmap.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ (last visited May 12, 2013); Technology Mechanism, 
UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/ttclear/jsp/ 
TechnologyMechanism.jsp (last visited May 12, 2013). 
 222 See, e.g., Establishing Linkages with American Institutions, BRIT. COUNCIL, http://www.britishcouncil. 
org/br/usa-education-marketing-guide-establishing-linkages (last visited May 12, 2013). 
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regarding barriers to entry, diminishing of competition, and trying to extend 
market power.223 
Similarly, public-sourced or public-sponsored commons may compete with 
private efforts to create commons, whether through the creation of technology 
or intellectual property pools or databases, or through the encouragement of 
liberal licensing policies.224 However, government-constructed and 
government-managed commons do not normally or purposefully compete with 
private R&D or innovation activity in research or production markets, even if 
they generate information outputs that are inputs to further R&D or innovation. 
Rather, such public commons typically seek to facilitate public or private R&D 
and innovation by lowering investment costs in creating infrastructure or other 
forms of commons resources and by pooling expertise and information that 
otherwise might not as readily be compiled. Such public commons thus 
typically supplement other forms of government sponsorship of public and 
private R&D and innovation, rather than substitute for them. 
As public recognition has grown of the development of open-source and 
other commons-based collaborations for innovation (not just in the software 
sector),225 more attention has been given to commons-based innovation 
 
 223 See, e.g., Richard J. Gilbert, Ties That Bind: Policies to Promote (Good) Patent Pools, 77 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 1, 1–4, 11–12 (2010); see also id. at 13–15 (noting also concerns for reduced innovation incentives from 
pooled rights to grantbacks of innovations—notwithstanding benefits from reduction of royalty-stacking—and 
for sheltering of weak patents from challenges due to reduced incentives to litigate, while recognizing potential 
benefits of reduced transaction costs for licensing complementary but not essential technologies). See 
generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm 
(recognizing pro-competitive benefits of intellectual property pooling arrangements and identifying prohibited 
acts and concerns).  
 224 For some examples of various types of private physical, intellectual property, and information 
commons that a government commons might supersede, see GREEN EXCHANGE, http://www.greenexchange. 
com (last visited May 12, 2013) (commons real estate for eco-friendly businesses); Eco-Patent Commons, 
WBCSD, http://www.wbcsd.org/work-program/capacity-building/eco-patent-commons.aspx (last visited May 
12, 2013); Welcome to PLOS, PUB. LIBRARY SCI., www.plos.org (last visited May 12, 2013); and Science, 
CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/science (last visited May 12, 2013). Cf. Robert M. Kunstadt 
& Ilaria Maggioni, A Proposed “U.S. Public Patent Pool,” NOUVELLES, Mar. 2011, at 10, 10–13 (proposing 
adoption of a mandatory opt-in “U.S. Public Patent Pool” to separate invention ownership and exploitation). 
 225 See, e.g., Daniel R. Cahoy & Leland Glenna, Private Ordering and Public Energy Innovation Policy, 
36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415, 435–51 (2009) (recognizing the paradigm of private ordering); Charles R. 
McManis, Introduction, 30 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 3–10 (2009) (classifying symposium papers according to 
four general categories: (1) business, law, and engineering perspectives; (2) open-source biotechnology; (3) 
open source and proprietary software development; and (4) collaborative innovation, the economics of 
innovation, and constructed commons). 
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strategies.226 These analyses emphasize both the nature of the innovation 
outputs of the collaborations and how the R&D, innovation efforts, outputs, 
and inputs constitute the communities that produce those outputs. Constitutive 
factors include, inter alia, the “rules-in-use” that determine the participation 
structures (or “openness”) of the community and its conditions on access to 
and uses of inputs and outputs.227 Given the multiplicity of potential rules, 
structures, and conditions, numerous questions arise that are similar to those 
discussed above regarding the nature of licensing behaviors or other 
authorizations for uses of the innovation outputs.228 Commons can adopt very 
differentiated approaches to the licensing of both inputs and outputs compared 
to non-commons-based innovation efforts of firms and individuals. Further, 
they can change their incentive structures over time, and various commons 
rules to police input and access policies may arguably violate antitrust laws.229 
One particular form of such a commons-based approach to R&D and 
innovation production that is worth separately identifying is the creation of 
governmental and nongovernmental standard-setting organizations.230 These 
organizations can both facilitate the development of innovation outputs and 
induce pooling of both inputs and outputs through cooperative licensing 
 
 226 See, e.g., Peter Lee, Toward a Distributive Commons in Patent Law, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 917, 946–92 
(arguing for conditional use by public institutions of spending and other inputs such as labor and bodily 
materials to generate a distributive commons that enhances access to downstream patented technologies); 
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Cultural Environmentalism and the Constructed Commons, 70 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 25–26 (2007) (analogizing open-source software licenses to conservation easements, 
which separate rights to copy from rights to exclude further copying or private rights to possess from public 
rights to enjoy). 
 227 See, e.g., Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, supra note 82, at 695–99, 704–05 (discussing openness 
and “rules-in-use”). 
 228 See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text.  
 229 See, e.g., Stephen M. Maurer, The Penguin and the Cartel: Rethinking Antitrust and Innovation Policy 
for the Age of Commercial Open Source, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 269, 269–70, 296–309 (noting the increasingly 
commercial nature of open-source projects and arguing that broad viral licensing—such as the GNU Public 
License (GPL)—is unnecessarily restrictive and violates antitrust law). 
 230 See, e.g., Alan Devlin, Standard-Setting and the Failure of Price Competition, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 217, 218, 224–31 (2009) (noting benefits of standardized technology compared to competitive, 
conflicting substitutes; identifying ubiquitous technological, functional, and safety-related standards; and 
relating the need for and benefits of standardization to, inter alia, network effects, interoperability, and 
avoidance of waste in doomed standards and obsolescent technologies); Christopher B. Hockett & Rosanna G. 
Lipscomb, Best FRANDs Forever? Standard-Setting Antitrust Enforcement in the United States and the 
European Union, ANTITRUST, Summer 2009, at 19, 19 (noting that standard-setting enhances innovation and 
competition by assuring that products are compatible and interoperable); Willard K. Tom, A Field Guide to 
Antitrust Issues in Standard Setting and Patent Pooling, in ANTITRUST & THE DEAL 2010, at 389, 391–92 
(2010) (distinguishing standard-setting from patent pooling regarding what is addressed by the commons—
fragmentation of components and future development paths versus fragmentation of ownership). 
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behaviors. Conversely, creation of a standard may create collusion, 
competition, and market-power extension, as well as generate concerns 
regarding hold up for pooled substitute and complementary technologies and 
regarding lock-in effects.231 In turn, such concerns may lead to commons-
based (or government-imposed) adoption of rules to require ex ante disclosure 
of patents and broad, open licensing on favorable terms, such as “reasonable 
and non-discriminatory” (RAND) or “fair” RAND (FRAND) requirements. 
However, such commitments may be vague, policing such rules may be 
problematic, and more specific ex ante licensing negotiations between 
potential users and patent holders may raise other antitrust concerns.232 
As noted for direct development and the ability to compel information 
transfers,233 the government may have a greater ability to compel cooperation 
and participation in commons than private bodies, both through direct 
acquisition and through conditional spending.234 Accordingly, government may 
be better able to supply needed R&D and innovation inputs to commons-based, 
targeted innovation activities in the public, commercial, or nonprofit sectors. 
However, because commons—by their nature as collective, collaborative 
 
 231 See, e.g., George S. Cary et al., The Case for Antitrust Law to Police the Patent Holdup Problem in 
Standard Setting, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 913, 914–19 (2011); Philip B. Nelson, Patent Pools: An Economic 
Assessment of Current Law and Policy, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 539, 542–49 (2007). See generally U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: 
PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 33–56 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/ 
P040101PromotingInnovationandCompetitionrpt0704.pdf. 
 232 See, e.g., BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42705, AVAILABILITY OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FOR 
STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENT HOLDERS 21 (2012) (discussing a proposal from the American Antitrust 
Institute to disclose proposed or maximum licensing terms); Cary et al., supra note 231, at 930–34; Richard J. 
Gilbert, Deal or No Deal? Licensing Negotiations in Standard-Setting Organizations, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 855, 
857–59 (2011); Nelson, supra note 231, at 548–49; cf. Daryl Lim, Misconduct in Standard Setting: The Case 
for Patent Misuse, 51 IDEA 559, 560–82 (2011) (discussing various forms of opportunism in standard-setting 
organizations and various doctrinal efforts to control it); Lauren E. Barrows, Note, Why the Enforcement 
Agencies’ Recent Efforts Will Not Encourage Ex Ante Licensing Negotiations in Standard-Setting 
Organizations, 89 TEX. L. REV. 967, 967–68 (2011) (noting continuing antitrust concerns over collusive 
action, such as price-fixing, that may impede ex ante negotiations). See generally Charles T. (Chris) Compton, 
Tumultuous Times: The Escalating US Debate on the Role of Antitrust in Standard Setting, COMPETITION L. 
INT’L, Feb. 2009, at 29, 30–34 (discussing various standards licensing enforcement disputes and responses to 
them). 
 233 See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
 234 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2006); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 
547 U.S. 47, 59–61 (2006) (discussing the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and noting that no limits to 
spending conditions exist if the federal government could undertake the action by itself); United States v. Am. 
Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 203–04 (2003) (plurality opinion) (same); cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601–07 (2012) (plurality opinion) (discussing coercion limits on federal spending 
that penalizes states). In contrast, the government may be less capable than the private sector of acquiring 
expertise in the form of human capital, particularly given limits on wages in government pay scales.  
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enterprises—may tend toward control that is comparatively more distributed 
than centralized,235 governments may be unlikely to direct and less likely to 
fund broad, collaborative commons-based innovation activity. Further, at least 
to date, government has tended not to collect or compel disclosure of 
information held by commons participants, such as pricing and licensing 
policies.236 More analysis is needed of these policies, as well as of 
government-commons institutions. 
E. Market Regulation 
Market regulation is also a very broad category. It covers: (1) direct 
product and process regulation; (2) information reporting and government 
disclosures, which may also lead to (or induce private action to avoid) direct 
product and process regulation;237 (3) recognition and certification 
programs,238 the premises of which are to provide incentives to direct private 
actions and to convey a market advantage that induces directed consumption 
patterns and thus greater innovation;239 and (4) a wide variety of market-based 
regulations, including market-entry, price, competition, and intellectual- 
property-rights regulations. All of these may affect innovation incentives by 
governing market-based returns. In addition, government may threaten to 
engage in market regulation or entry to alter the effects of or induce changes in 
private, market-based behaviors such as through nationalization, crown use, 
 
 235 See, e.g., Kapczynski, supra note 115, at 991 (distinguishing commons from property approaches to 
scientific and cultural production by their “disaggregated governance,” compared to individual control, as well 
as by the rules of access and sources of support). 
 236 See, e.g., Rudy Santore, Michael McKee & David Bjornstad, Patent Pools as a Solution to Efficient 
Licensing of Complementary Patents? Some Experimental Evidence, 53 J.L. & ECON. 167, 169 n.5 (2010) 
(noting various case studies and the absence of information on pricing and licensing). 
 237 See, e.g., WESLEY A. MAGAT & W. KIP VISCUSI, INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO REGULATION 4–5 
(1992). 
 238 See, e.g., Climate Leadership Awards, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/ 
climateleadership/awards/index.html (last updated Feb. 28, 2013) (describing a joint, government–private 
recognition program for institutions and individuals in regard to leadership and to internal and supply-chain 
reporting and reductions); History of ENERGY STAR, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www. 
energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=about.ab_history (last visited May 12, 2013) (describing a joint, governmental 
energy efficiency rating and voluntary labeling program for consumer household products). 
 239 See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 430-R-03-008, ENERGY STAR®—THE POWER TO PROTECT 
THE ENVIRONMENT THROUGH ENERGY EFFICIENCY 2–3 (2003) (discussing consumer lack of information, split 
incentives, and credibility that reduces decision-making risks). See generally Jamie A. Grodsky, Certified 
Green: The Law and Future of Environmental Labeling, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 147 (1993); Peter S. Menell, 
Structuring a Market-Oriented Federal Eco-Information Policy, 54 MD. L. REV. 1435 (1995). 
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exercise of statutory rights, statutory or compulsory licensing, and other 
actions that affect private market returns.240 
1. Product and Process Regulation 
Much has been written about the ability to stimulate or discourage 
innovation through direct government product and process regulation, 
particularly environmental regulation, including but not limited to technology-
based performance standards.241 In particular, some analyses address the 
relationships among the various types of command-and-control regulation and 
the way such regulation encourages and discourages technology 
development.242 Other analyses contrast regulation with ex post liability for 
damage caused by externalities and with tax or tradable permit scheme 
measures designed to internalize externalities and provide continuous 
environmental-improvement incentives.243 The relative effectiveness of these 
choices may depend in part on the ability to quantify and monitor the relevant 
activities at issue.244 
 
 240 See, e.g., Jakkrit Kuanpoth, Appropriate Patent Rules in Developing Countries—Some Deliberations 
Based on Thai Legislation, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. RTS. 447, 450 (2008) (discussing uncompensated “[c]rown 
use” and distinguishing compulsory licensing); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Flexible Application of Injunctive Relief in 
Intellectual Property Enforcement (with Reference to Lessons from the Emerging US Jurisprudence), in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 98, 100 (Xuan Li & Carlos M. 
Correa eds., 2009) (noting the potential to tailor remedies to promote domestic innovation and foreign direct 
investment); Luca Di Corato, Profit Sharing Under the Threat of Nationalization 20 (Swedish Univ. of Agric. 
Sci. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2010:1, 2010), available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/ 
58292/2/Luca_WP_01_10.pdf (modeling effects of investment and nationalization on Nash bargaining and 
suggesting extension to “creeping expropriation”); supra notes 97–99, 181, 220 and accompanying text; see 
also YEH, supra note 232, at 7–18 (discussing vague FRAND commitments and pending cases in the 
International Trade Commission seeking exclusionary orders); Khan & Sokoloff, supra note 65, at 6 (noting 
potential for patent expropriation without compensation in Britain in nineteenth century). 
 241 See, e.g., Nicholas A. Ashford et al., Using Regulation to Change the Market for Innovation, 9 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 419 (1985); Tomain, supra note 53, at 404 (discussing use of best available technology 
standards to create demand to “pull” technology, and contrasting it with the “push” approach of investments to 
solve a particular problem). 
 242 See, e.g., Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform 
Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (1985); Craig N. Oren, Prevention 
of Significant Deterioration: Control-Compelling Versus Site-Shifting, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1988); David 
Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30 UCLA L. REV. 740 (1983). 
 243 See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Commentary, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 
STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2341, 2376–91 (1996); Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 357 (1984). See generally ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, 
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 832–44 (1992). 
 244 See, e.g., BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 52; Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When Is Command-
and-Control Efficient? Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory 
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Other analyses focus on underinvestment and underproduction of 
innovations for environmental improvement because of their positive 
spillovers and on internalizing and regulating negative externalities.245 Some 
studies have sought to rank the innovation-inducing and technology-adoption 
effectiveness of different environmental regulatory policies, but have 
concluded that the results are ambiguous given competing influences of raised 
direct costs of regulation and reduced costs of lowered output.246 The rankings 
for innovation inducement may depend in part on “the innovator’s ability to 
appropriate spillover benefits of new technologies to other firms, the costs of 
innovation, environmental benefit functions, and the number of firms 
producing emissions.”247 Similarly, the rankings for technology adoption may 
depend on, among other things, the impact of the innovations and government 
regulatory responses as costs of abatement are reduced.248 Much additional 
work—particularly empirical analysis—still needs to be done to determine 
how to better induce innovation through such regulatory policy, how much 
innovation to induce, and how to determine the impact of technological change 
in general and of government R&D spending in particular.249 
In general terms, product or process regulation can induce “weak” 
innovation, when dominant firms or new entrants can improve on existing 
technologies, or “strong” innovation, when new entrants (and sometimes 
established firms) introduce disruptive technologies and displace dominant 
firms.250 Tinkering with market regulation, such as by adjusting patent 
doctrines (e.g., the standard for nonobviousness), can affect the financial 
 
Regimes for Environmental Protection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 887; Gloria E. Helfand, Standards Versus 
Standards: The Effects of Different Pollution Restrictions, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 622 (1991); cf. John F. Duffy, 
The Marginal Cost Controversy in Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 37, 53 (2004) (“[I]t may be a 
much simpler matter to tell how many cars cross a bridge or how much electricity is consumed than to 
determine how often an idea is used.”). 
 245 See, e.g., Popp, Newell & Jaffe, supra note 37, at 3–4 (noting the high uncertainty of innovation 
outputs that leads to underinvestment of inputs and “‘dynamic increasing returns’” to technology from 
learning-by-doing, learning-by-using, and network externality effects). 
 246 See id. at 13. Lowered output may be undesirable and thereby make an R&D subsidy preferable to, or 
more effective combined with, an emissions tax. See id. 
 247 Id. at 12–14 (citing David Ulph, Environmental Policy and Technological Innovation, in NEW 
DIRECTIONS IN THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF THE ENVIRONMENT (Carlo Carraro & Domenico Siniscalco eds., 
1997); Wesley A. Magat, The Effects of Environmental Regulation on Innovation, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 4 (1979); Wesley A. Magat, Pollution Control and Technological Advance: A Dynamic Model of the 
Firm, 5 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1 (1978)). 
 248 See Popp, Newell & Jaffe, supra note 37, at 24–26. 
 249 Id. at 16–18, 20–22. 
 250 See, e.g., Nicholas A. Ashford & Ralph P. Hall, Regulation-Induced Innovation for Sustainable 
Development, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Spring 2012, at 21, 21–22. 
SARNOFF GALLEYSPROOFS1 6/11/2013 9:03 AM 
2013] GOVERNMENT CHOICES IN INNOVATION FUNDING 1145 
incentives to shoot for weak or strong innovations.251 In turn, such market 
regulation may alter the direction and nature of the innovation that would 
otherwise be induced by direct product or process regulation. Strengthening 
environmental regulatory controls may lead to greater innovation by new 
entrants. New entrants not only may benefit from “innovation offsets” of 
reduced production costs associated with reduced control costs, but also may 
displace incumbent firms and provide a national comparative advantage, 
particularly if stringent regulation is imposed at a comparatively later time.252 
As some analysts have discussed, at least three factors affect the ability of 
such direct regulation to induce innovation. But identifying the factors and 
stating their influence is a far cry from analyzing their actual effects and 
comparative influence. 
The first factor is the willingness to innovate, which is affected by at least 
the following four considerations: “attitudes towards changes in production in 
general; . . . an understanding of the problem; . . . knowledge of possible 
options and solutions; and . . . the ability to evaluate alternatives.”253 In turn, 
each of these four considerations is affected by internal firm culture, risk 
taking, and personnel expertise. 
The second factor is the opportunity and motivation to innovate. This factor 
is affected on the “supply” side at least by two considerations: the nature of the 
regulation and the kind of technology “gap.” On the “demand” side, the second 
factor is affected at least by the following three considerations: “opportunities 
for cost savings or expansion of sales; . . . public demand for more 
environmentally sound, eco-efficient, and safer industry, products, and 
services; and . . . worker demands and pressures arising from industrial 
relations concerns.”254 
The third factor is the capacity to innovate. This capacity may be enhanced 
by at least the following five considerations: “an understanding of the 
 
 251 See, e.g., John H. Barton, Non-Obviousness, 43 IDEA 475, 492 (2003) (discussing reduced static and 
increased dynamic incentives of raising the nonobviousness bar); cf. Christopher-Paul Milne & Joyce Tait, 
Evolution Along the Government–Governance Continuum: FDA’s Orphan Products and Fast Track Programs 
as Exemplars of “What Works” for Innovation and Regulation, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 733, 734 (2009) (noting 
that the need for top-down regulatory control of risks imposes a higher bar for small entities in the life-
sciences sector to enter the market, and the higher the bar the greater the ability of incumbents to maintain 
their dominant position). 
 252 Ashford & Hall, supra note 250, at 21–22.  
 253 Id. at 22–23. 
 254 Id. at 23. 
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problem; . . . knowledge of possible options and solutions; . . . the ability to 
evaluate alternatives; . . . resident/available skills and capabilities to innovate; 
and . . . access to, and interaction with, outsiders.”255 Self-evidently, each 
consideration will be affected not only by internal firm culture and workplace 
policies, but also by whether the field being regulated has extensive networks 
for extra-firm collaboration.256 
Where regulation itself impedes innovation, it may generate a need for 
regulatory reform and induce regulatory innovation.257 Regulation also occurs 
within economic sectors that directly affect the funding of innovation, such as 
the financial sector. The financial sector recently has developed a higher-than-
usual rate of litigation of its patented innovations.258 Some recent analysis has 
suggested that in some cases financial regulations designed to reduce risks and 
increase accountability may unintentionally have interfered with innovation 
and entrepreneurship, venture capital, and forms of public offerings.259 
Accordingly, market regulation as a strategy to promote product and 
process innovation must be viewed very broadly indeed. Further, many 
approaches to product and process regulation also raise trade concerns and 
concerns with incentives to transfer research efforts to more lenient regulatory 
jurisdictions. In particular, late-to-the-table countries (e.g., in regard to setting 
and achieving environmental goals) may become more innovative than 
countries achieving earlier regulatory compliance and having comparatively 
 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id. 
 257 See, e.g., Timothy A. Slating & Jay P. Kesan, Making Regulatory Innovation Keep Pace with 
Technological Innovation, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 1109, 1111–19 (discussing innovation-inducing measures—
including tax subsidies and product regulation for biofuels—and burdens of regulating biofuel blending that 
call for revision to maximize the ability to capture social welfare from the regulation of biofuels); cf. Milne & 
Tait, supra note 251, at 735–36 (noting the need for regulatory innovation, focusing on three competing 
perspectives—innovation communities, policy makers, and stakeholders–and identifying two important 
developments—policy networks and formal advisory functions—within the regulatory process); Khan & 
Sokoloff, supra note 65, at 7 (discussing patent system regulatory responses in Britain following the Crystal 
Palace Exhibition of 1851, which brought attention to the innovative patent institutions in the United States). 
 258 See, e.g., Harhoff, supra note 41, at 55 (discussing restrictions on financial inputs to innovation); Josh 
Lerner, The Litigation of Financial Innovations, 53 J.L. & ECON. 807, 827–28 (2010) (noting that the 
disproportionate increases in litigation over financial services patents are consistent with nuisance-suit 
behavior that imposes both deadweight losses of licensing payments and innovation costs of distorted 
incentives skewed to socially unproductive litigation). 
 259 See, e.g., Jose Miguel Mendoza, Christoph Van der Elst & Eric P. M. Vermeulen, Entrepreneurship 
and Innovation: The Hidden Costs of Corporate Governance in Europe, 7 S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 3–4 
(2010). 
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fewer regulation-induced incentives for R&D. As one former government 
official has noted: 
[O]ne of the things we did study in the late ’90s and one of the things 
we noticed about environmental regulations in the United States was 
that the rise of the environmental regulatory regime from the ’70s to 
’80s actually drove innovation for about 15 to 20 years because 
companies were scrambling to develop technologies that could meet 
these new environmental protection requirements. But once 
everybody had reached the level of compliance required by the 
statute, that kind of became a floor, and there was no incentive built 
into the system for anybody to do anything that was better than the 
regulations required. Companies who were capable of doing zero 
emission factories got no benefit, no economic incentive, out of it. So 
then toward the end of the ’90s you started to see a whole lot of other 
countries that were then putting their environmental regimes in place, 
to start attracting a lot of R & D in the environmental technology area 
and to be developing innovative technologies, more innovative than 
what a lot of United States companies were doing. So that illustrates 
the impact of those kinds of regulatory issues; the other components 
here I think are obvious, investing in infrastructure, not just the 
physical plant and equipment, in roads and bridges and air traffic 
controller systems, which remain important, but over the years 
investing in the IT, in telecommunications infrastructure, in 
broadband capacity, all the things that make innovation possible as 
well as the work force.260 
2. Information Regulation 
Turning to the alternatives to product or process regulation, additional 
analyses of environmental regulatory options have addressed mandatory 
information disclosures and their use to generate private environmental 
improvement and innovation. For example, given adverse publicity and 
stockholder and public responses, it is widely thought that requiring disclosure 
of toxic chemical releases has led to efforts at and investments in R&D to 
achieve reduction of releases.261 This effect may be similar to that observed for 
 
 260 Can.–U.S. Proceedings 2006, supra note 15, at 54 (including comments of White House technology 
advisor and former Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Technology Policy Kelly Carnes). 
 261 See, e.g., James T. Hamilton, Pollution as News: Media and Stock Market Reactions to the Toxics 
Release Inventory Data, 28 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 98 (1995); Shameek Konar & Mark A. Cohen, 
Information as Regulation: The Effect of Community Right to Know Laws on Toxic Emissions, 32 J. ENVTL. 
ECON. & MGMT. 109 (1997); cf. Seema Arora & Timothy N. Cason, Why Do Firms Volunteer to Exceed 
Environmental Regulations? Understanding Participation in EPA’s 33/50 Program, 72 LAND ECON. 413 
(1996) (discussing similar reductions through voluntary efforts and disclosures); Ginger Zhe Jin & Phillip 
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recognition and certification, which may provide the public with information 
that drives purchasing and thus feeds back to innovation incentives.262 In this 
regard, the forthcoming disclosure of GHG data from domestic-law-required 
regulatory permits263 and national-plan-imposed efforts to track emissions264 
will be very interesting to watch. 
3. Recognition and Certification Programs 
Recognition and certification programs act principally as intrinsic 
motivation-affecting measures or as demand-pull instruments to induce 
innovation. They are thus contingent on personal preferences, institutional 
cultures, and market perceptions of the comparative benefits of the recognized 
or certified outputs in the relevant markets.265 Although an extensive literature 
is beginning to address teacher certifications and effectiveness,266 relatively 
little theoretical and empirical analysis has studied the innovation-inducing 
effects of certifications on technology development and dissemination.267 
Much more needs to be done in this area. 
 
Leslie, The Effect of Information on Product Quality: Evidence from Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards, 118 
Q.J. ECON. 409 (2003) (discussing consumer and consequent production responses to posting information on 
restaurant hygiene). 
 262 See, e.g., Popp et al., supra note 37, at 9–10 (citing Richard G. Newell, Adam B. Jaffe & Robert N. 
Stavins, The Induced Innovation Hypothesis and Energy-Saving Technological Change, 114 Q.J. ECON. 941 
(1999)) (discussing modeling showing that the effects of energy prices on innovation were greatest in years 
following adoption of product labeling requirements). 
 263 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. pt. 98 (2012) (containing the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Mandatory 
Reporting of Greenhouse Gases Rule). 
 264 See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3.3, 
Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22; UNFCCC, supra note 1, at arts. 4.1(a), 12.1(a). 
 265 See, e.g., DIRECTORATE GEN. ENV’T, EUROPEAN COMM’N, THE POTENTIAL OF MARKET PULL 
INSTRUMENTS FOR PROMOTING INNOVATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5, 
12–20 (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enveco/innovation_technology/pdf/market_pull_ 
exec_summary.pdf (discussing a broader range of demand pull mechanisms that include certifications; 
describing various “company push factors” that include size, company nature/history, supply chain position, 
competitive edge, corporate policies, path dependence, capital availability, and technology spillovers; and 
listing measures to enhance visibility, adoption, and flexibility of demand pull measures); supra notes 42–49 
and accompanying text.  
 266 See, e.g., Thomas J. Kane, Jonah E. Rockoff & Douglas O. Staiger, What Does Certification Tell Us 
About Teacher Effectiveness? Evidence from New York City (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 12155, 2006). 
 267 Cf. Milé Terziovski, Damien Power & Amrik S. Sohal, The Longitudinal Effects of the ISO 9000 
Certification Process on Business Performance, 146 EUR. J. OPERATIONAL RES. 580, 580–81 (2003) 
(identifying the principal motivation to certify as consumer pressure and noting major gaps in research into 
operations/quality management). 
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4. Market Regulation 
Turning to market regulation, both intellectual property and antitrust law 
are the most obvious places to look (although price controls, crown use, 
statutory and compulsory licensing, and other forms of regulation of private 
market returns may also be used).268 As suggested above, intellectual property 
is best viewed as a form of market regulation in that it provides a government 
subsidy (a property right) and government regulation of market behaviors 
through regulatory clearance and litigation mechanisms, some of which may be 
brought by the government.269 Analyses of direct measures to restrict static 
social welfare losses and balance them against dynamic innovation-incentive 
losses—such as price controls or compulsory licensing—have proven 
theoretically intractable.270 
Much effort has therefore gone into analyzing whether broader or narrower 
intellectual property rights will provide the best balance of incentives and 
access to promote both static and dynamic innovation. As the author of one 
recent modeling effort stated, however, such analysis is “embryonic,” and has 
yet to even begin its “infancy.”271 Another recent empirical analysis, which 
 
 268 See, e.g., Lionel Nesta, Francesco Vona & Francesco Nicolli, Environmental Policies, Product Market 
Regulation and Innovation in Renewable Energy (Dec. 21, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2192441 (discussing product market regulation effects 
under different forms of competition). For an excellent historical discussion of antitrust approaches to 
regulating innovation in the United States, see B. Zorina Khan, Antitrust and Innovation Before the Sherman 
Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 757, 759–60, 784–85 (2011), which noted continuity of federal approaches under the 
Sherman Act with earlier, state-based regulatory strategies, and early federal reliance on a market orientation 
and a network of regulations and antimonopoly rulings, except in regard to the state-owned enterprise of the 
postal service. The other forms of market-return regulation are not discussed further here, but warrant 
additional consideration as they affect innovation incentives. 
 269 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 2319(a) (2006). 
 270 See, e.g., Scotchmer, supra note 18, at 33–35 (discussing competing incentives of strong or weak 
protection for first- and second-generation innovators and the lack of perfect solutions through ex ante 
licensing); Rudolph J.R. Peritz, Competition Within Intellectual Property Regimes: The Instance of Patent 
Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW: NEW FRONTIERS 27 (Steven Anderman & Ariel 
Ezrachi eds., 2011) (discussing the “analytic stalemate” between exclusionary rights and open access). 
 271 John M. Golden, Innovation Dynamics, Patents, and Dynamic-Elasticity Tests for the Promotion of 
Progress, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 47, 50 (2010); cf. Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against 
Patents 1, 15–19 (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis Research Div. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 
2012-035A, 2012), available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-035.pdf (discussing historical and 
comparative evidence that weak patent systems mildly increase innovation, but strong patent systems retard 
innovation); Andrea Blasco, Disclosure and Collaboration in Dynamic R&D Races 2–3 (Mar. 15, 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1961356 (noting 
that the intellectual property literature has not to date considered the effects of rights on incentives for 
collaboration of sequential innovators with pioneering innovators, and arguing that weak patent protection may 
fail to promote innovation because of strategic decisions to ignore disclosed and unprotected knowledge). 
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collected a comprehensive dataset in a particular field (plant variety 
innovation), has suggested that intellectual property rights generally were not 
significant for innovation.272 Again, that finding may not translate beyond the 
particular field, may have been historically dependent on the particular 
institutions and their development, and thus may not provide useful insights to 
extrapolate to other contexts.273 
Notwithstanding the tremendous efforts by some of our brightest minds, 
things have not progressed too much past the identification of at least three 
basic sets of competing concerns that must be assessed and balanced in all 
sorts of situations. These three concerns are: (a) the adequacy of incentive 
effects, transactions costs, effects on cumulative innovation, and loss of 
consumer surplus from higher prices; (b) the adequacy of consumer signaling 
to producers and overinvestment in intellectual products; and (c) the 
duplication of innovative efforts resulting from the incentive effects, wasted 
efforts to design around rights to provide functional equivalents, and inefficient 
development of initial innovation prospects.274 Debatably, there may be some 
situations where certain forms of intellectual property rights are thought to be 
clearly needed (such as patents for pharmaceuticals, even when they impose 
high social costs)275 or to be wholly ineffectual (such as patents for 
pharmaceuticals for “neglected diseases”).276 
 
 272 See Paul J. Heald & Susannah Chapman, Veggie Tales: Pernicious Myths About Patents, Innovation, 
and Crop Diversity in the Twentieth Century, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1051, 1053–56. 
 273 For plant varieties, special utility patents exist for asexually reproduced varieties, and special 
protection exists for sexually reproduced varieties, in the form of Plant Variety Certificates, which supplement 
utility patent protection in plants recognized in 1985. See Act of May 23, 1930, ch. 312, 46 Stat. 376; Plant 
Variety Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-577, tit. I, § 1, 84 Stat. 1542, 1542 (1970) (current version at 7 U.S.C. 
§ 2321 (2006)); Ex parte Hibberd, No. 645-91, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443, 444–45 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 18, 1985). 
The effects of such additional protection on innovation are theoretically uncertain. Cf. Heald & Chapman, 
supra note 272, at 1054–56, 1058–60. 
 274 See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 
(1969) (identifying three logical fallacies in the “nirvana approach” to public-policy economics); Kitch, supra 
note 159; Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483 
(1996); Merges & Nelson, supra note 159; Fisher, supra note 125, at 4–10. Note that for other public goods, it 
is often thought to be efficient when producers do not obtain full social returns, given the existence of positive 
externalities. 
 275 Some have argued that the pharmaceutical industry is such a situation, given the high costs of R&D 
and product approval, the uncertainty of successful results from particular research paths, ease of reverse 
engineering, and low costs of generic production. See Fisher, supra note 125, at 11. But for low-income 
markets, some adjustment (such as through compulsory licensing) may be necessary to address social welfare 
losses, albeit accompanied by higher transaction costs and diminished ex ante innovation incentives. See id. at 
12–13. However, there is no theoretically necessary reason why alternatives to patent rights might not work as 
well (or better) than intellectual property rights (e.g., more substantially subsidizing pharmaceutical research 
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The optimal strength and scope of intellectual property rights also depend 
on multiple, competing considerations. These include the following eight 
concerns: (a) private reliance on intellectual property rights as a means of 
recouping investments in innovation, combined with government market 
regulation of the returns on such investments;277 (b) public funding of inputs to 
private research and development; (c) values of private researchers (or their 
firms) regarding the public’s interests; (d) the pioneering or cumulative nature 
of the research; (e) the degree of centralization of firm structures; (f) 
dependence on intellectual property for funding of R&D or firm ventures; (g) 
documentation and publication practices that make it harder to build on others’ 
work or to avoid infringement or clear rights; and (h) various types of network 
externalities.278 As remains true almost a decade after it was said, “[e]fforts to 
identify an optimal balance of these various effects continue, but no solution is 
yet in sight.”279 
Antitrust analyses reflect similar theoretical and empirical limitations. 
Much has been written about differences of innovation and product markets 
and the need to differentiate antitrust and intellectual property doctrines as a 
result of different market structures and dynamics for different products.280 
Innovation market concerns reflect the insight “that a merger between the only 
 
and clinical trials, or direct government development of pharmaceuticals). The factors that may affect these 
comparisons are discussed further supra in Part I. 
 276 See, e.g., So et al., supra note 66, at 2081. Note that effective price discrimination may not be 
practically possible, and even when possible, it may not be profit maximizing. See, e.g., Flynn, Hollis & 
Palmedo, supra note 170, at 190. 
 277 See, e.g., Cohen, Levin & Mowery, supra note 36, at 548–49; Fisher, supra note 125, at 11 n.24, 19–
21. See generally Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and 
Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 
2000). 
 278 See Fisher, supra note 125, at 17–18, 24–25. 
 279 Id. at 9. 
 280 See, e.g., Ordover, supra note 149, at 514–18 (discussing intertemporal market linkages and 
interactions between upstream research and downstream products, noting particular concerns when firms 
compete in both markets, suggesting greater solicitude for upstream research markets, and describing four 
contextual considerations to improve rule-of-reason analysis); J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, Antitrust Regulation of Innovation Markets: Remarks at the ABA Antitrust Intellectual Property 
Conference 1–4 (Feb. 5, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/090205innovationspeech.pdf 
(discussing the history of regulating innovation markets, practical constraints on using antitrust analysis, and 
the temporal relationships of innovation, product markets, and concerns over joint venturing activity). See 
generally Jonathan M. Barnett, Property as Process: How Innovation Markets Select Innovation Regimes, 119 
YALE L.J. 384 (2009); Mark A. Lemley, Industry-Specific Antitrust Policy for Innovation, 2011 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 637. 
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two, or two of a few, firms in R&D might increase the incentive to suppress at 
least one of the research paths.”281 
Again, as a recent criticism of even a limited discussion of innovation 
markets has stated, the “fundamental flaws in the innovation market concept 
are . . . [that we] don’t know about the relationship between market structure 
and effect, that error costs are high, and that competition is multidimensional. 
In other words, we don’t know a lot and acting on our ignorance . . . is 
costly.”282 Historically, such research markets or activities have been treated 
differently from other markets within intellectual property law to prevent their 
domination by exclusive rights,283 just as they have been treated differently in 
competition law. More recently, some scholarship has sought to identify 
criteria for determining the kinds of entry-blocking or entry-burdening 
innovations in research markets that would warrant antitrust scrutiny or 
immunity for product markets, while recognizing the difficulties of assessing 
whether the consumer-perceived advantages are genuine and warrant the 
corresponding reductions in competition.284 
Intellectual property, of course, can be a barrier to innovation, particularly 
where broad rights or multiple rights need to be licensed to perform research or 
produce products, if licensing in the research market is inefficient.285 This 
 
 281 MICHAEL A. CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: HARNESSING THE POWER OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW 297 (2009). 
 282 Geoffrey A. Manne, Assuming More Than We Know About Innovation Markets: A Review of Michael 
Carrier’s Innovation in the 21st Century, 61 ALA. L. REV. 553, 555 (2010) (reviewing CARRIER, supra note 
281). But cf. Michael A. Carrier, Innovation for the 21st Century: A Response to Seven Critics, 61 ALA. L. 
REV. 597, 601–03 (2010) (noting the limited scope of the suggested analysis, but its comparative benefits to 
existing analysis). 
 283 See, e.g., Henrik Holzapfel & Joshua D. Sarnoff, A Cross-Atlantic Dialog on Experimental Use and 
Research Tools, 48 IDEA 123, 133–44 (2007–2008) (noting the origins of the experimental-use doctrine as a 
statutory interpretation of (non)infringement rather than as a defense to infringement, and tracing its history of 
and focus on noncommercial research). See generally Ofer Tur-Sinai, Cumulative Innovation in Patent Law: 
Making Sense of Incentives, 50 IDEA 723, 741–72 (2009–2010) (discussing innovation-inducing effects from 
comparing patent scope with experimental-use exceptions). 
 284 See Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Anticompetitive Innovation and the Quality of Invention, 27 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 4–5 (2012) (suggesting antitrust immunity for innovations that merely burden 
competition, scrutiny for innovations that prevent market entry, and invalidity for such inventions that are not 
“genuine[ly]” defined as having “a feature that consumers would pay a premium to acquire, though the 
necessary premium is less than the five to ten percent over the existing price that often accompanies market-
definition analysis” and thereby “transforms a product into a pure substitute in the eyes of consumers”); see 
also id. at 19–33. 
 285 See, e.g., Cahoy & Glenna, supra note 225, at 427–30; cf. Condon & Sinha, supra note 65, at 11–13 
(discussing concentration of technologies and intellectual property rights in a limited number of companies 
from very few countries, thus raising concerns for biodiversity, affordable access, and innovation). 
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reiterates the concern, although this time within intellectual property law, 
about whether innovation markets should be subject to differential treatment 
under a broad, experimental-use doctrine or a similar doctrine (e.g., fair 
use).286 The need for external or internal controls of such rights may depend on 
the degree to which private ordering solutions are effective. Such solutions 
may include the following four approaches: (a) vertical integration (firm 
consolidation) by acquiring the rights; (b) joint-venturing or cross-licensing; 
(c) patent-pooling; and (d) standard-setting (with relevant commitments to 
provide reasonable cost access).287 In turn, the ability to use any of these 
solutions may depend on the following five factors: (a) a limited number of 
rights at issue; (b) a limited number of parties who need to coordinate; (c) the 
existence of synergies or complements for the technology; (d) the duration of 
the market for the technology;288 and, of course, (e) antitrust-law treatment of 
each of these approaches and factors. Misuse doctrine may bring these 
potential innovation-reducing concerns within intellectual property law without 
limiting the concerns to effects on competition.289 
5. General Considerations 
At a basic level, theory tends to distinguish the process of innovation from 
the market that evaluates the innovation and determines whether particular 
innovations are viewed as successful. Thus, one recent economic review 
distinguished useful innovations from useless innovations and innovation 
markets from product markets, while attributing “Schumpeterian creativity” to 
the comparatively better ability to imagine future products and production 
provided at lower factor-of-production prices.290 Further, some analysts 
attribute successful entrepreneurial activity to the rational, profit-maximizing 
efforts of those with talent and who seek to create monopoly rents through 
 
 286 See, e.g., Holzapfel & Sarnoff, supra note 286, at 180–84 (discussing expected returns in regard to 
research tool markets); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1177, 1205 (2000) (discussing factors to consider in adopting a fair-use approach to patent 
noninfringement). 
 287 See, e.g., Cahoy & Glenna, supra note 225, at 440–45. 
 288 See id. at 446–52. 
 289 See, e.g., Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475, 478–79 (2011) 
(encouraging use of misuse doctrine to address innovation harms without equating it to antitrust analysis); 
Thomas F. Cotter, IP Misuse and Innovation Harm, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 52, 55–59 (2011), 
http://www.uiowa.edu/~ilr/bulletin/ILRB_96_Cotter.pdf (noting concerns with line-drawing and solicitude for 
“false positives” or “false negatives”); Lim, supra note 232, at 560. 
 290 Israel M. Kirzner, Between Useful and Useless Innovation: The Entrepreneurial Role, in HANDBOOK 
OF RESEARCH ON INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 36, at 12, 14. 
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innovation from which they can derive over-profit. In turn, the highest private 
returns lead to the investment (allocation) of talent and its application toward 
particular innovative activities.291 And, of course, others attribute non-profit-
maximizing (extrinsic or intrinsic) motivations to innovators (i.e., those with 
talent or other creativity who do not merely imitate).292 
From a market-based and institutional perspective, rather than that of the 
individual, “increased competition or entry threat induces firms to invest more 
in innovation in order to escape the competitive threat.”293 Similarly, 
innovation should be understood as a continuous and temporally extended 
cycle among creators, entrepreneurs, the market, and laws, and trade 
liberalization not only induces investment, but also permits enhanced R&D 
spillovers.294 
Further, the category of entrepreneurs as a social group or entrepreneurship 
as a status may also affect both choices to innovate and returns that particular 
innovations achieve. As a recent study noted, although the economic benefits 
of entrepreneurship are large and economic returns on education are higher for 
entrepreneurs than for employees, the preference for entrepreneurship is “not 
high” among more highly educated individuals.295 
Whether private incentives for allocating either innovative resources or 
talent apply in the same way to publicly funded innovation activity is at least 
questionable. Even assuming profit maximization as the basic motivation for 
funding recipients, such publicly funded actors may either be risk-averse or 
foresee greater returns from continued public funding than from the potential 
for market returns on their monetary, time, and effort investments. Rent-
seeking may further jeopardize profits of established productive sectors and 
adversely affect innovation and investment.296 
 
 291 Marcus Dejardin, Entrepreneurship and Rent-Seeking Behavior, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON 
INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 36, at 17, 18–19. 
 292 See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text. 
 293 Philippe Aghion, Industrial Policy, Entrepreneurship and Growth, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON 
INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 36, at 45, 45. 
 294 See id.; see also MICHAEL A. GOLLIN, DRIVING INNOVATION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGIES 
FOR A DYNAMIC WORLD 94–95, 122–23 (2008). 
 295 Mirjam van Praag, Who Values the Status of the Entrepreneur?, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON 
INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 36, at 24, 24. 
 296 Dejardin, supra note 291, at 20. 
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As others have noted, countries have adopted very different industrial 
policies for development, including: import substitution policies to develop 
local demand (as in Latin America); export promotion policies, achieved 
through tariff and nontariff barriers and maintaining undervalued exchange 
rates (as in Korea or Japan); and targeted subsidies to industries and efforts to 
develop “national champion” firms (as in France and China) and different 
intellectual property doctrinal standards.297 Since the 1980s, a “Washington 
consensus” has developed among international lending and aid institutions and 
economists emphasizing nontargeted policies that improve investment 
markets.298 But targeted or other efforts to protect “infant industries” from 
lower cost foreign competition, while developing domestic acumen through 
“learning-by-doing,” have not demonstrated notably higher productivity 
growth or correlation to increased skill than in the absence of such efforts.299 
Nevertheless, in theory, targeted investment may overcome private firm 
disincentives to invest in new sectors of an economy given existing cross-
sectoral externalities that reflect and reinforce existing patterns of 
specialization.300 Even in existing developed economies that tend to innovate 
on the “world technology frontier,” there may be a need for targeted industrial 
policy to minimize or overcome innovation in the “wrong direction” that 
maximizes private returns but does not promote long-term growth or other 
socially beneficial production.301 
Similarly, financing constraints for particular kinds of firms and R&D more 
generally may lead to suboptimal innovation, in part due to the lack of an 
intermediate market for the outputs of innovation, “such as ideas, patents, 
licenses, blueprints, prototypes, etc.”302 Various reasons exist to think that 
financing for R&D will be suboptimal compared to financing for capital 
assets—particularly for new entrants or small firms—and the problem may be 
further exacerbated by differential tax treatment of R&D and intangibles 
 
 297 See GOLLIN, supra note 294, at 308–21; Aghion, supra note 293; see also U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, 
PUB. 4199, CHINA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT, INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICIES, AND 
FRAMEWORKS FOR MEASURING THE EFFECTS ON THE U.S. ECONOMY (2010). 
 298 Aghion, supra note 293, at 46. 
 299 See id. at 47–48. 
 300 See id. at 47–49. 
 301 Id. at 50; see Aghion, supra note 63, at 2 (noting the need for industrial policy); Arrow, supra note 13, 
at 21 (noting increasing returns-to-scale theories based on straightforward economies of scale, learning by 
doing, and the fact that costs but not rewards of innovation are independent of the size of markets). 
 302 Harhoff, supra note 41, at 55. 
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relative to other investments.303 Hence, government intervention of various 
kinds may be warranted, particularly as venture capital is not fully effective at 
reaching innovative private firms.304 
In summary, far too little is known at present to make informed choices 
among the different forms of market regulatory measures, much less among 
the different forms of innovation funding choices available to government. 
CONCLUSION 
As the preceding discussion should make clear, the choices of government 
funding substitute for, complement, and interact with each other in various 
complex ways that are highly contingent on institutions and their cultures. No 
choice or combination of government innovation funding mechanism is clearly 
theoretically preferable. The taxonomy discussed above, moreover, 
demonstrates that too much choice exists for government decision makers who 
may have limited public support for or limited ability to make informed 
decisions regarding what will induce the most invention, innovation, and 
diffusion of technology. Given the concerns about underproduction of 
innovation due to externalities and positive spillovers, and given the impending 
climate-change needs, we likely need to more aggressively adopt and expand 
multiple funding choices. In particular, this includes expanding commons-
creation and commons-management so as to maximize innovation 
infrastructure in both the public and private sectors. At a minimum, we need 
government to both provide more funding to innovation overall and to induce 
the market to supply additional funding. 
Further, as we move forward, we will need to better evaluate the choices 
that we make to better avoid wasting massive resources and opportunities 
when seeking to generate desperately needed innovation outputs. In particular, 
we need to understand and track the outputs better, interrogate and evaluate the  
 
 
 303 See id. at 57–58 (discussing collateral and liquidity problems and information asymmetries, high 
adjustment costs for R&D—particularly regarding human capital losses, and financing of innovation 
principally from equity or retained earnings rather than debt). 
 304 See id. at 59; see also William R. Kerr & Ramana Nanda, Financing Constraints and 
Entrepreneurship, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 36, at 
88. 
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internal cultures of both private entities and public bureaucracies, and match 
actual decision making with developing theoretical and empirical analyses. 
Hopefully this Article will contribute to efforts to create better information, 
better understanding, and better decision making. 
 
